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Abstract
This thesis consists of six chapters of which chapters one and two provide the
introduction and a brief review of policy regimes in South Africa. Each of the three
chapters that follow has its own structure and method. Chapter six concludes the
thesis. The chapters share a common theme of understanding the effects of policy
regime changes in stabilising inflation and output dynamics in emerging economies
with reference to the South African economy. This thesis’s theme is premised on
the debate that policy rate setting better describes the conduct of monetary policy
and helps stabilise inflation and output. There is, however, no consensus on the
appropriate policy regime and the specification of a policy rule that is universal
for all economies.
Chapter three establishes whether central bank preferences are related to gov-
ernors’ tenures when there is a change in policy regime. A time-varying parameter
approach that allows the policy preferences to vary over the sample period is used.
The results show that the policy parameters exhibit significant changes and that
the South African Reserve Bank placed more weight on output relative to inflation
over the period 2000 and 2007. The dynamic responses of output and inflation
under different central bank governors show different outcomes because of changes
in central bank policy preferences and not necessarily different governors at the
central bank.
The effects of policy switches on macroeconomic performance using a regime-
switching small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is
investigated in chapter four. The novelty of this chapter is found in the structural
model, where the primary commodity export sector follows a regime shock process
that affect the policy parameters is allowed. The results suggest that an unex-
pected monetary policy shock and its variances account for a smaller proportion of
macroeconomic fluctuations in the South African economy compared to external
shocks and its variances in the form of exports, import cost inflation, risk premia,
ii
preference and technology changes.
Chapter five consists of an investigation into central bank credibility by simu-
lating a Markov-switching Bayesian vector autoregression model with time-varying
transition probabilities. This is based on changes in monetary policy leading to
clear policy goals. The findings suggest that the policy authority was credible
over the period 2003 to 2007 and over the period 2010 until 2016. However, policy
switched to a low credibility regime over the period 1990 to 1999 and in 2008. It
is found that a positive yet unexpected change to credibility leads to a reduction
in policy rate which leads to a decrease in inflation. The conclusion indicates
that credibility is an important instrument that helps policy authority to conduct
efficient monetary policy in stabilising inflation and output.
iii
Declaration
I, Samuel Addo, certify that this thesis I present for examination for a Ph.D. in
Economics degree at the Doctoral Degrees Board Office through the School of
Economics, University of Cape Town is my own original work other than where
I have cited that it is the work of others. Further, it has not been previously
presented for a degree at any university.
iv
Acknowledgements
I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Mark Ellyne and Dr Lebogang Mateane
for their valuable guidance and timely intervention to complete this thesis. Any
time I reflect on this adventure I will remember their patience and the love they
exhibited towards me in the course of this thesis. I thank Dr Amos Carl Peters who
was outstanding in helping me to shape my vague ideas into a research project.
I would like to thank uniBank Ghana Limited for giving me the opportunity
to pursue a doctoral degree. In particular, Dr Kwabena Duffuor II, the Chief
Executive Officer, Ekow Nyarko-Dennis, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer and
Paul Appiah-Gyasi, former Head of Finance, all of the uniBank Ghana Limited,
are thanked for their encouragement and financial support.
Life in Cape Town would have not been enjoyable without all the wonderful
friends that I met along the way. I thank especially Eliud Moyi and James Gichuki,
who stood by me side by side at all times and shared jokes, food and drinks and
excellent Bible expositions. Indeed, they have been great friends and I thank
them. Eliud, especially, is thanked for his patience and for reading my drafts with
good feedback.
My greatest treasures, Adom, Oheneba and Kobby, are thanked for their sac-
rifice whilst I was away. I thank my family for always being there for me with
their prayers, good counsel and the comfort they always provide.
I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Nana Adwoa Serwaa Addo, for all the sacrifices




1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Focus and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Overview of Monetary Policy Regimes in South Africa 5
2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Monetary Policy Regimes since 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Governors’ Policies and Economic Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 Policy Regime Changes and Central Bank Preferences 16
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.4 Econometric and Estimation Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4.1 Econometric Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4.2 Choice of Priors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5.1 Baseline Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5.1.1 SARB Policy Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5.1.2 Governors’ Tenures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.1.3 Policy Regimes and Dynamic Responses . . . . . . 38
vi
3.5.1.4 Consistency of Baseline Results with Other Policy
Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5.2 Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.5.2.1 An Alternative Real Economic Activity—Output
Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5.2.2 Policy Regime Variances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5.3 Counterfactual Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.7 Appendix A: Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7.1 Kalman Filter Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7.2 Independence Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm . . . . . . . . 47
3.7.3 Estimated Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Policy Regime Switches and Evolution of Macroeconomic Out-
comes 64
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3 Modeling Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3.1 Model Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3.2 Extract of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4 A Regime-Switching DSGE Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.4.1 Generic Framework and Solution Method . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.2 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.4 Priors and Markov Switches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5.1 Model Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5.2 Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5.3 Smoothed Transition Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5.4 Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
vii
4.5.5 Evolution of Macroeconomic Outcomes in the South African
Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5.5.1 Generalised Dynamic Responses . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5.5.2 Counterfactual Dynamic Responses . . . . . . . . . 92
4.5.5.3 Variance Decompositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5.5.4 Historical Decompositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.7 Appendix B: Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.7.1 Model Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.7.2 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5 Central Bank Credibility Following a Regime Change 117
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3 Theoretical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.4 Method, Data and Stylised Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.4.1 Econometric Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.4.3 Stylised Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4.3.2 Diagnostic Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.5.1 Regime Switches in Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.5.2 Generalised Dynamic Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.5.3 A Comparison of Monetary and Inflation Targeting Regimes
Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.7 Appendix C: Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.7.1 Diagnostic Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.7.2 Estimated Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
viii
6 Conclusion 150
6.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150




3.1 Kalman filter estimates of time-varying policy preferences . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Governors’ preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Policy regime changes preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4 Policy regimes innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Baseline time-varying parameter VAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 Robustness check: Kalman filter estimates of time-varying policy pref-
erences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.7 Robustness check: time-varying parameter VAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.8 Counterfactual simulation of policy preferences, assuming Governor Stals
had continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.9 Counterfactual simulation of time-varying dynamic responses, assuming
Governor Stals had continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.10 Counterfactual simulation of policy preferences, assuming no monetary
policy regime change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.11 Counterfactual simulation of time-varying dynamic responses, assuming
no monetary policy regime change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.12 Counterfactual simulation of policy preferences, assuming SARB had
not responded to the financial crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.13 Counterfactual simulation of time-varying dynamic responses, assuming
SARB had not responded to the financial crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.14 Recursive means for the key policy parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1 Observed variables use in this study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
x
4.2 Smoothed transition probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3 Dynamic responses to policy and export shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4 Dynamic responses to risk premia and import-cost inflation shocks . . . 105
4.5 Dynamic responses to preference and technology shock . . . . . . . . . 106
4.6 Dynamic responses to monetary policy regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.7 Dynamic responses to export shock regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.8 Dynamic responses of import-cost inflation regimes . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.9 Dynamic responses of risk premia regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.10 Variance deompositions of policy rate and CPI inflation . . . . . . . . . 111
4.11 Variance decompositions of output gap and real consumption . . . . . . 112
4.12 Variance decompositions of net gold exports and exchange rate depreciation113
4.13 Historical decompositions of policy rate and consumer price inflation . . 114
4.14 Historical decompositions of output gap and real consumption . . . . . 115
4.15 Historical decompositions of net gold exports and exchange rate depre-
ciation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.1 Evolution of credibility and macroeconomic indicators . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.2 Time-varying smoothed transition probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.3 Posterior densities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.4 Generalised dynamic responses—full sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.5 Monetary aggregates regime generalised dynamic responses . . . . . . . 148
5.6 Inflation targeting regime generalised dynamic responses . . . . . . . . 149
xi
List of Tables
2.1 Macroeconomic performance by regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Economic performance by governors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1 Summary of literature results in South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Descriptive statistics of variables of interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 SARB policy preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4 Governors’ tenures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5 Counterfactual policy preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.6 Detail baseline policy preference parameters—full sample . . . . . . 49
4.1 Statistics for model comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2 Posterior mode of structural and shock process parameters . . . . . 83
4.3 Posterior mode of policy parameters and structural innovations . . . 86
4.4 Robustness check: Statistics for model comparison . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5 Rest of model equations fitted to data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.6 Parameters and variables description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.7 Robustness check: Posterior mode of structural and shock processes 101
4.8 Robustness check: Posterior mode of policy parameters and struc-
tural innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.2 Regression estimates: Dependent variable credibility . . . . . . . . 136
5.3 Unit root tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.4 Johansen’s cointegration test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
xii





Monetary policy regimes are analysed by macroeconomists to understand how
central banks change monetary policy in response to the economic fundamentals
that are output growth, inflation and the exchange rate. Further, policy regimes
provide a basis for forecasting changes in a central bank’s reaction function and
also help in evaluating a central bank’s monetary policy strategy. As documented
by McCallum (1999), some of the pioneers of studies on monetary policy regime
changes are Wicksell (1898) and Fisher (1920). For example, Wicksell (1898) pro-
poses that interest rates should change with changes in prices, whereas Fisher
(1920) revisits the quantity theory of money and suggests that price stability
should be part of monetary policy objectives because a free market economy is
characterised by the need to stabilise the economy.1 Among others, Bordo and
Schwartz (1999), Taylor (1999) and McCallum (2000) provide an overview of mon-
etary policy regime changes.
Money supply was the main policy instrument in the 1980s, yet the velocity
of money supply was unstable.2 In the early 1990s a popular monetary policy
1See also the Swedish price level targeting in the 1930s proposed by Cassel (1930) and Fried-
man (1953) constant money growth rate used in the 1960s.
2The money supply instrument is defined as growth rate of money supply equals desired
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regime, the so called ‘Taylor rule’ was proposed by Taylor (1993).3 The Taylor
rule has attracted much research attention from policy authorities and academic
economists in Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, South Africa, the United
Kingdom (U.K.), the United States (U.S.), etc. Although empirical literature
shows that the Taylor rule characterises monetary policy behaviour in a number
of advanced and emerging economies, no consensus has emerged on the appropriate
policy regime and a single specification of the Taylor rule for all economies (see
Woodford (2015), Taylor (2014) and McCallum (2015)). Therefore, this provides
a motivation to examine monetary policy regime changes in emerging economies
with reference to the South African economy.
The choice of South Africa for this thesis is because it has consistent and clean
time series data that can provide accurate and solid results for the issues under
review compared to Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS). These countries
have limited time series data and the quality of their series mostly starts from
2000. Therefore, a study of this nature has to minimise the trade-off between the
model, methods and data that are most appropriate to generate reliable estimates.
Similarly, South Africa is part of a larger group of the emerging economies of the
BRICS nations and sub-Saharan Africa that represents a potential experimental
laboratory for monetary policy regime analysis. This evaluation may help in an
understanding of the importance of policy regime changes after adoption of infla-
tion targeting regime over a decade and a half in emerging economies. Moreover,
South Africa has a long tradition of monetary policy practice and central bank
independence similar to the U.K., U.S. and elsewhere. The chronology of mone-
tary practice includes the efficient reintroduction of the gold standard in 1925, the
adoption of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1939, monetary aggregates regime
in 1986 and the adoption of an inflation targeting regime in February 2000 until
output growth rate plus the target inflation rate.
3This means that the nominal interest rate is set to the equilibrium interest rate plus a
weighted average of the real GDP gap and a four-quarter moving average of actual GDP deflator
less target inflation.
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present (see Rossouw (2010) for more details).
In South Africa, the empirical literature on monetary policy regime changes
is extensive—with mixed results. Similarly, the analysis of the behaviour of the
South African Reserve Bank (henceforth SARB) policy decisions are confined to
traditional econometrics techniques such as sub-sample and generalised method
of moments (GMM), which are too weak to capture the changing dynamics of the
economy.4 This thesis complements the existing research by using an econometric
framework that allows for the capture the possibility of changes in policy pref-
erences, regime switches in policy and central bank credibility in the context of
monetary policy regime changes.
1.2 Focus and Structure
The focus of this thesis is mainly on the following aspects: first, the investigation
of policy regime changes and central bank preferences to understand whether gov-
ernors’ tenures are linked to central bank preferences over time. Although there
is much literature on monetary policy regime changes, few studies employ a time-
varying parameter approach to examine whether policy authorities preferences
change over time which may be influenced by the changing economic environ-
ment. Secondly, a Markov-switching rational expectations model is employed to
assess sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in the South African economy as a
result of policy regime switches. In Markov switching models, a subset of the
parameters or the full model parameters change over time and private agents are
aware of the probability of these changes occuring and incorporate them in their
decision-making in a way that is different from constant dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium models. Thirdly, central bank credibility is studied before and
after a regime change to understand how these changes impact on monetary au-
thorities’ credibility. Given this, credibility is considered as to whether policy
4See Aron and Muellbauer (2002), Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007), Alpanda et al. (2010),
Naraidoo and Paya (2012) and Peters (2016), for some of the traditional econometric studies.
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authority says what it does and does what it says. This thesis, therefore, does not
examine which policy targeting rule variables or measures of credibility indicators
are suitable.
The thesis is structured along the following lines. Chapter one considers the
background, focus and structure of the thesis. Chapter two reviews monetary pol-
icy regimes in South Africa to serve as a foundation for the empirical estimations.
In chapter three, monetary policy regimes and the changing behaviour of central
banks are analysed. Individual governors’ tenures are also examined to determine
whether they are linked to central banks’ model parameters. To analyse monetary
policy regimes across time, a time-varying parameter approach is used with the
aim of revealing if and how central bank’s policy settings have changed as a result
of the adoption of inflation targeting regime without splitting the sample.
In chapter four, monetary policy regime shifts and evolution of macroeconomic
performance in a small open economy are estimated using a Markov-switching
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (MS-DSGE) approach. This allows for
the capture of parameter instability as a result of changes in policy regimes and
structural breaks in macroeconomic data. This will help determine the sources of
changes that have contributed to low volatility in inflation and output. Chapter
five examines central bank credibility to determine the transmission mechanism of
credibility on monetary policy and its effects on inflation and output stability. In
this sense, a Markov-switching Bayesian vector autoregressive model with time-
varying transition probabilities method is used to reveal how credibility evolves.
The final chapter concludes with a brief summary of the thesis themes and provides
direction for future research.
4
Chapter 2
Overview of Monetary Policy
Regimes in South Africa
2.1 Background
This chapter surveys monetary policy regimes in South Africa to provide insight
into how the policy authority has responded to changing domestic and global
economic conditions and sets the basics to tie in the empirical estimations in the
subsequent chapters.
Historically, there have been four main monetary policy regimes since the es-
tablishment of the South African Reserve Bank on 30 June, 1921. These are the
gold exchange standard regime—popularly known as the gold standard between
1925 and 1932, the Bretton Woods arrangement—also known as the gold dollar
standard between 1939 and 1979, the monetary aggregates regime from 1986 to
1999, and the present regime of inflation targeting.
Inflation was low and stable during the gold standard regime. However, the
conduct of monetary policy lost credibility following the U.S. stock market crash
in 1929 and World War II. This resulted in large capital outflows from the South
African economy that led to a slowdown in domestic economic activity, setting
the stage for the adoption of the Bretton Woods agreement regime. Under the
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Bretton Woods system, the primary policy goal was an adjustable-peg exchange
rate, whereas gold was tied indirectly to the policy objective.
Although this period recorded high real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth
compared to the gold exchange standard regime, it was short lived as a result of a
weak credible policy rule. Therefore, in the early 1960s, the South African econ-
omy witnessed a persistent upward inflation trajectory that directed the policy
authority towards inflation stability (see Rossouw (2010)). The SARB introduced
a number of monetary policy measures to curb the rising inflation trajectory. This
included restrictions on foreign direct investment and the repatriation of domes-
tic investment by non-residents, and direct credit controls, but were jettisoned in
1979 owing to its ineffectiveness.
Given that this thesis focuses on monetary aggregates and inflation targeting
regimes, the next section provides an account of the two regimes and its effects on
inflation and output growth. In section three, the SARB governors’ policies and
economic performance are reviewed. The final section concludes.
2.2 Monetary Policy Regimes since 1980
This section provides a brief review of monetary aggregates and inflation targeting
regimes in South Africa. Detailed overviews of the two policy regimes are provided
in Gidlow (1995) and Aron and Muellbauer (2007). Prior to an inflation target-
ing regime, the governors of the SARB and other officials with the Bank had the
ultimate responsibility for policy decision, but the decision process was not trans-
parent between 1980 to 1999. The SARB anchored monetary policy decisions on
money growth targets and set flexible money growth targets that were announced
each year. The SARB resorted to a monetary condition index towards the end of
the 1990s (Stals (1997)).
Following the adoption of a monetary aggregates targeting, policy authority
pursued a market-oriented policy. Thus policy authority abandonded direct credit
controls, and from 1994 gradually removed the exchange rate controls; and the
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bank rate was replaced with the repurchase (repo) rate in 1998. This was, however,
due to the effects of financial innovations in the early 1980s and capital account
liberalisation in 1995 that reduced the credibility of monetary aggregates regime as
a policy rule. Way back in 1996, the SARB carried out implicit inflation targeting
with a target range of 1 to 5 per cent. In 1998, the Bank was not prepared to
adopt an explicit inflation target approach due to weak forecasting models, among
others.
In February 2000, the SARB officially announced inflation targeting as a new
monetary policy regime. In accordance with the 1996 Constitution (Act No.
8, 1996) and the SARB Act (Act No. 90, 1989), an inflation target is set by the
Finance Minister in consultation with the SARB. Nevertheless, the policy instru-
ment required to stabilise the economy is within the control of the SARB. Policy
authority follows a flexible inflation target range of 3 to 6 per cent.
At the inception of the inflation targeting regime, the SARB target was the
consumer price index excluding mortgage interest cost, that is, the CPIX until
2008. However, due to the rebasing of the consumer basket by Statistics South
Africa, it changed from CPIX to overall consumer price index (CPI) from January
2009, but retains the target range. In addition to this, there has been improved
accountability, transparancy, credibility and forecasting as a result of an infla-
tion targeting regime. Similarly, the policy rate is set by the Monetary Policy
Committee that currently consists of six members who meet six times a year.
Given that its aim is to assess policy regimes from 1980, this thesis examines
whether an inflation targeting regime plays a significant role in stablising inflation
and output. Table 2.1 presents economic performance by regimes over the period
1986 and 2016. The summary statistics in Table 2.1 show that inflation targeting
regime is associated with low inflation averaging 5.81 per cent relative to average
inflation of 12.26 per cent over the monetary aggregates regime. A similar trend
is exhibited regarding real GDP and policy rate, with average rates of 3.01 and
8.16 per cent over an inflation targeting regime compared to 1.82 and 14.46 per
7
Table 2.1: Macroeconomic performance by regimes
CPI Inf Real GDP Policy Rate
Regime1 Regime 2 Regime1 Regime2 Regime1 Regime2
Summary statistics
Mean (%) 12.26 5.81 1.82 3.01 14.46 8.16
Median 13.08 5.67 2.08 2.93 15.00 7.50
Standard Deviation 3.81 2.60 2.82 1.91 3.72 2.64
Observations 80 67 80 67 80 67
Stochastic test
Variance ratio 1.11 1.57 1.53 1.47 1.42 1.61
Zstat. 1.02 2.93 3.14 2.45 2.96 3.08
Probvalue 0.309 0.002 0.002 0.014 0.003 0.002
AR(1) regression
Parameter 0.56 0.46 0.19 0.55 0.88 0.95
Std. error 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.03
tstat. 5.81 4.11 1.61 5.20 20.64 28.53
Note: Quarterly data from 1986 to 2016. Regime 1 represents monetary aggregates targeting
regime (1986–1999), Regime 2 represents inflation targeting regime (2000–2016). In the AR(1)
regression, a log difference of real GDP and CPI is used. Source: SARB, IMF and Author’s
calculation April 17, 2017
cent respectively over the monetary aggregates targeting regime. The standard
deviation is used to measure the variability of inflation, real GDP and policy rate.
Table 2.1 shows that inflation targeting regime is associated with a low variability
in inflation, real GDP and policy rate compared to monetary aggregates regime.
The stochastic test is used to ascertain the predictability of the key macroeco-
nomic variables in the two regimes. The variance ratio shows that the series ex-
hibit substantial nonstationarity in both regimes because all the ratios are greater
that one. This implies that the series in the model are economical essential in
explaining large macroeconomic fluctuations. However, the Zstatistics shows that
CPI inflation is more predictable in an inflation targeting regime relative to the
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monetary aggregates targeting regime. The Probvalue of the stochastic test in-
dicates that inflation is persistent at a 5 per cent marginal significance level in
inflation targeting regime, while inflation ceases at 5 per cent significance level in
a monetary aggregates regime. Although the autoregressive model of order one
AR(1) estimates show that during the two regimes, policy rate and CPI inflation
parameters are positive and persistent, real GDP is not persistent even at 10 per
cent significance level in the monetary aggregates regime.
The evidence from Table 2.1 suggests that an inflation targeting regime sta-
bilises inflation and output relative to a monetary aggregates regime. This is
consistent with the view that more vigorous attention to inflation stability on the
part of central banks around the globle in the past three decades is responsible for
these changes. This cannot, however, be conclusive evidence as an understand-
ing of the dynamics of policy regime changes on economic performance is more
complicated than what these simple estimates suggest.
2.3 Governors’ Policies and Economic Performance
The governors are evaluated in relation to their policy objectives and the Bank’s
key macroeconomic outcomes. In terms of governors, the SARB has had four
governors of which three governors served approximately ten–year period each,
from 1981 to 2009. These are De Kock from January 1, 1981 to August 7, 1989;
Stals August 8, 1989 and August 7, 1999; Mboweni August 8, 1999 to November
8, 2009 and Marcus from November 9, 2009 to November 8, 2014 (see Rossouw
(2010) and Gidlow (2011)).
Under the governorship of De Kock, monetary policy was characterised by a
discretionary policy with price stability as one of the Bank’s policy objectives.
The policy authority did not focus only on price stability but also on a stable
output growth and the balance of payments management. To achieve these pol-
icy objectives, the SARB used monetary aggregates as an intermediate target to
influence interest rates. The SARB, therefore, allowed the market to function and
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adopted broad market base instruments to stimulate the economy. These include
open market operations, money market discounting policies, the purchase and sale
of foreign exchange and public debt management.
Due to the SARB’s broad policy objectives, monetary policy was characterised
as one of economic policies in the country similar to agricultural, industrial, labour
and fiscal policies.1 In the long run, the SARB did not evisage trade-off between
its broad policy objectives but the Bank recognised this in the short run. Thus
conflict could arise either between inflation and output growth or inflation and the
balance of payments management. Therefore, the SARB understood that policy
could change depending on the business cycle phase that the domestic and global
economy experienced, such as job creation and gold price shocks. Discretionary
policy was constrained by lack of central bank independence, a weak balance of
payments position and high inflation in the 1980s as well as the global financial
pressures.
Under Stals’s governorship, the guiding policy principle was stable monetary
policy as a precondition for sustainable economic growth in the long run. This,
and the new mandate of the SARB Act (Act No. 90, 1989), influenced the Bank’s
policy objective of low price stability with a goal to safegard the value of the
South African currency. Although the SARB did not target inflation explicitly,
its objective was to bring inflation to the levels of its major trading partners.
During Stals’s tenure, monetary policy was mainly used to stabilise inflation
relative to De Kock’s tenure, where monetary policy had multiple objectives. The
SARB used the interest rate as a policy variable and adopted direct and indirect
instruments for controlling the economy. The direct instruments include the tem-
porary suspension of market forces to ensure that financial markets adhered to
lay down rules such as minimum and maximum levels of lending and borrowing;
and exchange control regulations. The indirect instruments include central bank
credit to commercial banks, open market operations and the purchase and sale of
1 See, Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System and Policy in South Africa; Final
Report (1985).
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foreign currency in the spot and forward foreign exchange market.
This benefited the economy, because at the end of Stals’s term, inflation de-
clined from 15.04 per cent in the fourth quarter of 1989 to 3.34 per cent in the third
quarter of 1999, in line with South Africa’s major trading partners’ inflation rate.
Similarly, money supply growth declined from 22.3 per cent at the end of 1989
to 10.2 per cent at the end of 1999. Another remarkable event was a successful
political transition from apartheid to constitutional democracy in 1994. Despite
this, monetary policy faced challenges in the form of excessive depreciation of the
South African rand against the U.S. dollar and the British pound sterling. Fur-
ther, political uncertainty during the tenure of Stals led to economic sanctions and
capital outflows that adversely affected the conduct of monetary policy. Similarly,
the effects of globalisation did not spare the conduct of monetary policy during
Stals’s tenure.
Governor Mboweni’s policy objective was to maintain low price stability and
an economic growth that follows the tenets of inflation targeting framework. This
included improved accountability through explicit quantitative inflation targets,
increase transparancy and credibility via regular communication with economic
agents; and a response to shocks to the domestic economy through forecasting
and fiscal dominance independence. During Mboweni’s term there were two main
constraints to monetary policy. First, the exchange rate shocks coupled with food
price hikes in 2002 increased inflation and the policy rate to 12.75 and 13.5 per
cent compared with 7.01 and 12 per cent, respectively in 2000. Secondly, the oil
price increases from 2006 which peaked in July 2008 and coincided with the global
financial crisis in 2008. This increased inflation and the policy rate from 5.53 and
9.00 per cent in 2006 to 13.42 and 12 per cent in 2008, which adversely affected real
GDP growth declining to a negative 1.04 per cent in 2009. Despite these events,
inflation, policy rate and real GDP growth witnessed considerable stability over
the period 1999 to 2009.
In November 2009, Marcus became the central bank governor and continued
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with the policy of an inflation targeting regime. However, due to the economic
recession triggered by the global financial crisis, monetary policy was constrained
with economic uncertainty and weak output growth. Policymakers, therefore,
adopted countercyclical fiscal policy to boost job creation and economic growth
that accounted for high public debt and concerns for fiscal substainability. During
this period fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP increased, with government ex-
penditure moving on an upward trajectory while tax revenue increased marginally.
Tax revenue increased from 23.2 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 24.5 per cent of GDP
in 2014 and expenditure increased from 24.5 per cent of GDP to 27.8 per cent of
GDP over the same period. At the end of 2014, goverment debt stock stood at
47.1 as a percentage of GDP compared to 30.1 percent of GDP in 2009.2
This translates into a persistently poor economic performance as against ex-
pected real GDP growth rate, as announced in the government budget statements
from 2009 to 2014. In 2009, the goverment projected a GDP growth rate of 1.2 per
cent. The realised GDP growth rate, however, was negative 1.04 per cent, whereas
realised GDP growth outturn was 1.4 per cent as against the projected real GDP
growth rate of 2.7 per cent in 2014. This means that policymakers overestimate
economic growth to exploit economic agent expectations that the economy is ex-
panding, whereas in reality, it is contracting and experiencing an undesirablely
high unemployment rate.
Table 2.2 shows how policy regimes shaped the SARB governors’ policy pref-
erences over the period 1981 and 2014. According to Table 2.2, the period under
Governor Mboweni is considered as the most stable period for inflation as it is ev-
ident from the means and the standard deviations. The governorship of Stals and
Marcus were somewhat less stable, while that of De Kock was the most unstable
2This can be obtained from South African Reserve Bank Full Quarterly Bulletin No. 278
December 2015
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Table 2.2: Economic performance by governors
CPI GDP Policy rate
De Kock Stals Mboweni Marcus De Kock Stals Mboweni Marcus De Kock Stals Mboweni Marcus
Summary stat.
Mean(%) 14.70 10.23 6.03 5.38 1.80 1.31 3.67 2.29 14.10 15.73 9.85 5.57
Median 14.87 9.43 5.94 5.67 2.09 1.18 4.09 2.51 14.25 16.00 9.50 5.50
Std. Dev. 2.34 3.47 3.28 0.90 3.08 2.24 2.08 0.98 3.75 2.32 2.16 0.55
Observations 35 40 41 21 35 40 41 21 35 40 41 21
Stochastic test
Variance ratio 1.014 1.16 1.67 1.44 1.60 1.53 1.57 1.14 1.46 1.31 1.66 1.20
Zstat. 0.08 1.12 3.07 1.81 2.61 2.42 2.26 0.48 2.25 1.40 3.22 1.20
Probvalue 0.933 0.264 0.002 0.070 0.009 0.015 0.024 0.633 0.025 0.161 0.001 0.232
AR(1) reg.
Parameter 0.13 0.55 0.52 0.17 -0.16 0.51 0.45 0.41 0.87 0.85 0.92 -0.01
Std. error 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.25 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.05
tstat. 0.75 3.79 3.75 0.69 -0.93 3.58 3.11 1.91 11.35 9.40 13.67 -0.20
Note: Quarterly data from 1981 to 2014. De Kock=data from 1981:Q1 to 1989:Q3, Stals=data from 1989:Q4 to 1999:Q3,
Mboweni=data from 1999:Q4 to 2009:Q3 and Marcus=data from 2009:Q4 to 2014:Q4. In the AR(1) regression, we use log dif-
ference of real GDP and CPI. Source: SARB, IMF and Author’s calculation April 20, 2017.
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period for inflation. Regarding real GDP growth rate, Stals’s term recorded the
lowest and highest variability in output growth, averaging 1.31 per cent and a
standard deviation of 2.34 per cent compared to Governor de Kock, with an 1.8
per cent average real output growth. Similarly, under Governor Mboweni, real
GDP growth grew by 3.67 per cent on average compared to Governor Marcus
with 2.29 per cent average output growth. Similar evidence is found with respect
to policy rate, except during the governorship of Marcus, who achieved the lowest
policy rate of 5.57 per cent. Although her tenure was five years relative to the
remaining three governors who served ten years each.
Under Governor Mboweni, inflation, real GDP growth and policy rate are more
likely to be predicted as they are evident of the variance ratio. An important
observation is that under Governors de Kock and Stals, it was most unlikely for
the inflation and the policy rate to be predicted. Similarly, during Marcus’s tenure,
policy and real GDP growth rates are unstable and less likely to be forecast. The
AR(1) regression in Table 2.2 shows that inflation, real GDP growth and policy
rate were persistent under Governors’ Mboweni and Stals. This implies that these
variables had the tendency to remain near their most recent values and there was
a possibility of persistent changes of the variables over time among the governors.
Regarding Marcus, the past values of policy rate, inflation and output growth are
unable to explain current values at a 5 per cent marginal significance level. This
is self–explanatory, because over this period fiscal dominance was at the centre
stage of policy relative to monetary policy. This was, however, different under
De Kock’s tenure, where inflation and real GDP were not persistent at 5 per cent
marginal significance level, except the policy rate.
The results clearly support the policy objectives of each of the governors. Al-
though comparing the governors’ preferences using the stochastic test and AR(1)
estimates, persistence and volatility have declined in some of the variables, and
not all have exhibited decline. This ambiguity of results and the sources of decline
in the variables that may have happened is of particular interest to researchers.
14
2.4 Conclusion
Given changes in policy regimes, there are a number of reasons that a regime-
switching and time-varying parameter investigation would be suitable for the
South African economy. First, monetary policy frameworks across the world have
undergone many changes over the last three decades. Secondly, the structural
changes of the SARB policy objectives, due to different policy regimes and dif-
ferent governors, can be expected to lead to different central bank policy prefer-
ences. Further, governors’ policies and economic performances provide interesting
dynamics of the governors’ preferences for inflation relative to output stability.
Since the tenures of the SARB governors have had some consistency over the
sample period with varying monetary policy strategies, the thesis will explore
whether the changes in the governors’ preferences are linked to a central bank
policy preferences in chapter three. This thesis may guide an understanding of
policy continuity along shifts across different policy regimes.
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Chapter 3
Policy Regime Changes and
Central Bank Preferences
3.1 Introduction
Central bank preferences are subject to change as a result of changes in monetary
policy regimes and any uncertainty about the future state of the economy. Thus
the importance that central banks attach to inflation and output and their views
on the economic structure may change over time. This results in uncertainty for
private agents about future monetary policy conduct, and this uncertainty also
affects monetary policy conduct by changing central banks’ preferences on inflation
and output parameters. For example, Clarida et al. (2000), Cogley and Sargent
(2005), Kim and Nelson (2006), Taylor and Williams (2010) and Orphanides and
Williams (2011), find that the Federal Reserve Board responded less to inflation
volatility in the 1980s compared to the 1970s.
In spite of this, no consensus has emerged on central banks’ optimal prefer-
ences on inflation and output stability. This has made recent studies such as
Boivin et al. (2010), Canova and Ferroni (2012) and Baxa et al. (2014) suggest
that further investigation into the following is necessary: first, the effects of mon-
etary policy on inflation trends to identify the key policy risk and performance
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of inflation targeting regime after the global financial crisis; secondly, determine
the factors that influence policy preferences changes to understand the drivers of
inflation and output volatility, and finally, incorporate the interaction of finan-
cial and macroeconomic variables in modern models due to near zero rates and
unconventional monetary policy pursued during the financial crisis.
This chapter focuses on the second debate, that is, factors that influence
changes in policy preferences, to understand the dynamics of inflation and output
volatility. It is proposed in this chapter that central bank preferences to target
variables such as inflation and output vary over time and different preferences
of policy authorities may coincide with the tenure of a particular central bank
governor. The central bank of interest in this analysis is the South African Re-
serve Bank. This debate is relevant and current to the SARB’s monetary policy
regimes decisions, because the South African economy has experienced signifi-
cant changes in its monetary policy framework over the past three decades. This
includes competition in the financial markets in the early 1980s, the monetary ag-
gregates targeting rule first set in 1986, and inflation targeting in 2000. Moreover,
the SARB has had four governors, of which three have had consistent terms of
approximately ten years each between 1981 and 2009, but each have had varying
beliefs about monetary policy conduct.1 Further, the governors also served under
different political regimes, that is, the apartheid era and constitutional democracy.
These may influence the weights the governors attach to the policy parameters for
inflation and output stability. In particular, the chapter analyses whether changes
in central bank preferences are related to governors’ tenures, that is, do individual
governors exert policy influence in an event of policy regime changes in the context
of a time-varying parameter approach?
This chapter relates to other literature that examines changing central banks
policy, for example Primiceri (2005), Kim and Nelson (2006), Baxa et al. (2014),
1The governors’ tenures are De Kock from January 1, 1981 to August 7, 1989; Stals from
August 8, 1989 to August 7, 1999; Mboweni from August 8, 1999 to November 8, 2009 and
Marcus from November 9, 2009 to November 8, 2014.
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Lakdawala (2016), Belongia and Ireland (2016) and Keating and Valcarcel (2017).
Further, most of these studies only examine the effect of monetary policy inno-
vations on the economy, for example Primiceri (2005), Baxa et al. (2014) and
Lakdawala (2016). This chapter is different, however, for its main contribution
to the literature is that it focuses on the role played by changes in central banks’
policy preferences and its associated shock volatility on the economy due to mon-
etary policy conduct. Two algorithms are used to determine whether there are
time–varying monetary policy parameters which capture changing policy authori-
ties’ model parameters and, thus, regime changes. The algorithms are the Kalman
filter and the independence Metropolis-Hastings. The Kalman filter is used to
obtain the estimates of the time-varying parameter Taylor type rule. The in-
dependence Metropolis-Hastings computes the dynamic responses and stochastic
volatility within a setup of a time-varying parameter of a Taylor-type rule. This
implies that the variances of the stochastic processes vary over the sample period.
The importance of this undertaking is twofold. First, changes in policy au-
thorities’ preferences are characterised by the possibility of time-varying mone-
tary policy regime changes that may be influenced by the changing structure of
the economy and different governors at the central bank. Secondly, this chapter
adds to the existing research about South Africa, where changes in policy regime
investigations are carried out under the assumption of time-invariant policy pa-
rameters.2 Therefore, the relevance of this chapter is that it shows that at different
points in time and over different monetary policy regimes, the economy responds
differently to policy shocks. Also, a counterfactual analysis is provided to estimate
time-varying parameters that capture changing policy preferences. More specif-
2 This includes sub-sample, instrumental variables and a generalised method of moments
(GMM) that are weak to capture the changing dynamics of the economy (see Aron and Muell-
bauer (2002), Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007), Gupta et al. (2010) and Naraidoo and Raputsoane
(2015)). Further, other literature that evaluates monetary policy conduct focuses on a nonlinear
econometric framework and asymmetric preferences that include Naraidoo and Paya (2012) and
Baaziz (2015).
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ically, alternative issues, such as how monetary policy would have been with no
change in governors, no monetary policy regime changes and the impact of the
financial crisis in 2008 on the South African economy, is evaluated.
The findings suggest that the SARB changed its policy responses to inflation
and output from the beginning of the 1980s. In an inflation targeting regime the
dynamic responses to output are higher than the responses in a monetary aggre-
gates regime.3 Throughout the sample period, variations in the policy parameters
are found. Furthermore, the baseline results are robust to the output gap charac-
terisation of monetary policy conduct. That is, volatility of the policy innovations
show upward persistence in the output gap but remain low in the policy rate and
in inflation which is similar to the baseline results.
This study also found that the SARB’s policy parameters for output stability
increased significantly between 2000 and 2007, then shifted to inflation stability
in 2008.4 These findings relate to those of Lakdawala (2016) and Belongia and
Ireland (2016), who find that the Federal Reserve Board attached larger weight
to output than inflation from 2000 to 2007. All the counterfactual experiments
carried out herein suggest that regime changes exert substantial effects on central
banks’ loss function parameters for output and inflation compared to potential
outcomes, had there not been a regime change.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows: section two surveys the literature;
sections three and four lay out the theoretical model and estimation strategies,
while section five presents the empirical results. Section six provides some remarks
and a conclusion.
3That is, inflation targeting began February 2000 and is the existing monetary policy frame-
work and a monetary aggregates regime started between 1986 and 1999.
4During this period, the South African consumer price index inflation exhibited a rising
trajectory over the years 2006 and 2008 and inflation peaks in August 2008 at about a 12 per
cent. This is also consistent with oil price peaking over the June and July 2008 period. This
could have led to a change in policy parameters towards inflation stability.
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3.2 Related Literature
This section surveys the literature to ascertain the effects of changes in monetary
policy regimes and the behaviour of central banks. Changing central bank pref-
erences as well as the changing structure of an economy raise significant issues
about monetary policy conduct. Thus important issues surround whether cen-
tral banks behaviour changes over time and whether changes in monetary policy
regimes explain low volatility in macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and
output.
To address these questions, Taylor (1993) proposes a monetary policy rule
that characterises monetary policy conduct and thus exhibits the conduct of the
Federal Reserve Board.5 This means that the Taylor rule contains information on
central banks’ preferences and policy authorities’ views about the structure of the
economy.
With regards to the central bank preferences, a puzzle that has emerged about
the Taylor rule is: what is the optimal trade-off between inflation and output pref-
erence parameters of central banks? In the Taylor rule, a preference parameter
of inflation larger than one suggests that changes in the interest rate are strong
enough to stabilise inflation. Taylor (1999) shows that when the inflation parame-
ter is smaller than one, a positive inflation shock leads to an increase in a nominal
interest rate, which is not sufficient to help reduce the real interest rate and may
destabilise the economy. To examine policy authorities’ views about the state of
the economy, the formal approach is to minimise the central bank loss function
together with private agents’ optimisation problems. When the weight on out-
put is zero in the loss function, the central bank does not care about the output
gap. If, however, the output parameter is not zero, then there is a possibility
5The initial policy rule suggests that the nominal interest rate should be set to a long run
interest rate plus a weighted average of a real GDP gap and a four-quarter moving average of
actual GDP deflator less target inflation. But the Taylor rule did not specify the target inflation
of the central bank. The focus was on how central banks should set the policy rule with weights
of 1.5 and 0.5 for GDP deflator and GDP gap, respectively.
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of a dual objective of inflation and output stability. On the contrary, Woodford
(2003a) suggests that incorporating the output gap in the loss function does not
imply that central banks have dual objectives. Instead, the output gap may have
predictive content about inflation and output stability.
Over the past two decades, the Taylor rule has attracted attention from policy
authorities. Though the literature has proven that the Taylor rule fits central
banks’ preferences well in a number of advanced and emerging economies, no
consensus has emerged on the appropriate specification of the Taylor rule for all
economies (see Woodford (2015), Taylor (2014) and McCallum (2015)).
Alternative monetary policy rules, however, have been proposed due to some
weaknesses of the Taylor rule. This includes a lack of forward-looking in the
Taylor rule, parameter instability and data uncertainty that may lead to multiple
equilibria. These researchers include Taylor (1999), Sack and Wieland (2000),
Svensson (2003) and others. An important point in the discussion of alternative
monetary policy rules is whether the policy preference parameters change over
time in relation to personalities at the helm of the central bank. Among others,
Boivin (2005) and Kim and Nelson (2006) estimate Taylor-type rules and find
that the behaviour of the Federal Reserve Board changes over time. Further,
the Federal Reserve Board reacted less to real economic activity in the 1980s
compared to the 1970s. Similarly, Kuzin (2006) and Assenmacher-Wesche (2006)
use a backward-looking Taylor rule with money target as the instrument, and find
that the Bundesbank sensitivity to inflation varies over time. They indicate that
the Bundesbank places more weight on inflation relative to the Federal Reserve
Board.
Furthermore, Taylor (1999) and Ball and Mazumder (2011) posit that mone-
tary policy shifts anchored inflation in the 1980s and 1990s. These studies used
historical, split sample and instrumental variable techniques to investigate the ef-
fects of monetary policy on inflation and output. Unfortunately, these techniques
are unable to capture heterogeneity across the entire sample period as well as non-
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linear dynamic patterns, such as amplitude dependence and asymmetries. This
chapter, therefore, seeks to address this issue by employing a time-varying coeffi-
cients with multivariate stochastic volatility. Because the inflation targeting per-
formance of different monetary policy regimes did not affect developed economies,
but inflation targeting emerging economies benefited (Ball; 2010; Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel; 2007; Abo-Zaid and Tuzemen; 2012). These studies also ascer-
tain that the conduct of monetary policy by the European Central Bank has less
effect on national central banks.
According to Lucas (1976), orthodox macroeconometric techniques are weak in
accounting for the link between macroeconomic fundamentals and policy regime
shifts. The Lucas critique has revolutionised macroeconometrics, resulting in a
new class of estimation strategies. One of the estimation strategies is the reduced-
form Markov-switching model of Hamilton (1989). Markov-switching studies show
that central banks respond to policy regime shifts and there are improvements in
the fit with persistent heterogeneity in the policy rule (see Sims and Zha (2006),
Lange (2010) and Canova and Ferroni (2012)). A difficulty with reduced-form
Markov-switching analyses is that it may not be easy to interpret the unobservable
state variables and is not suitable for nonstationary data.
To overcome these problems associated with the Markov-switching model, this
chapter employs a time-varying parameter technique. A time-varying parameter
technique allows one to capture the changes across the entire sample period and
considers the patterns of models with nonlinear dynamics (see Primiceri (2005),
Trecroci and Vassalli (2010), Korobilis (2013), Baxa et al. (2014), Lakdawala
(2016) and Belongia and Ireland (2016)). Further, the central message of these
authors is that exogenous and endogenous shocks explain high volatility in inflation
over the 1970s compared to the 1980s. That is, inflation volatility declined and
unexpected changes in monetary policy shocks affected output, exchange rate and
money growth. Consequently, traditional techniques of splitting samples may
provide misleading empirical results of monetary policy outcomes.
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In emerging economies, Mohanty and Klau (2005), Perrelli and Roache (2014)
and others estimate monetary policy regime changes, and suggest that central
banks allocate more weight to output than inflation and also allocate some weight
to the exchange rate. Further, some policy authorities react to financial and
banking stress indicators and also to the exchange rate in small open economies,
see Batini et al. (2003) and Baxa et al. (2013).
In South Africa, there are quite a number of recent studies (Ortiz and Sturzeneg-
ger (2007), Steinbach et al. (2009), Alpanda et al. (2010) and Peters (2016)).
However, these authors’ analyses are confined to constant parameter estimations.
Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) use a rolling regression in a dynamic general equi-
librium model to examine the SARB policy strategies. They find that the SARB
exhibits an anti-inflation bias, has increased its weight on the output gap, and
attaches a low weight to the exchange rate.6
Some of the findings of a constant parameter analyses in South Africa are sum-
marised in Table 3.1. From Table 3.1, most of the findings of the SARB’s policy
Table 3.1: Summary of literature results in South Africa
Author(s) Sample Method Inflation Output
Aron and Muellbauer (2002) 1986:Q2 -1997:Q4 IV -0.19 (5.80) 0.37 (3.70)
Mohanty and Klau (2005) 1990:Q1-2002:Q4 GMM 0.04 (7.09) 0.07 (7.53)
Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) 1983:Q1 - 2002:Q4 RR 1.11 0.27
Alpanda et al. (2010) 1994:Q1 - 2008:Q4 BM 1.42 0.29
Naraidoo and Raputsoane (2015) 2000:M1 - 2012:M4 GMM 1.43 (29.08) 0.60 (17.06)
Peters (2016) 1979:Q3 - 2007:Q3 ML 0.84 (6.10) 0.07 (1.40)
Source: Author’s compilation August 31, 2016. Note: BM is Bayesian method, IV is in-
strumental variables, GMM is generalised method of moments, ML is maximum likelihood
estimates and RR is rolling regression. t-statistics in parentheses.
preferences are not different from advanced and other emerging economies. How-
6However, they admitted that the method used is weak to—account for interventions used
by the SARB to control inflation, output and the exchange rate.
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ever, the question that arises is: does the weight allocated to output and inflation
preferences change over time? To answer this question, it is necessary to model
monetary policy regime changes in a time-varying setting. This chapter, there-
fore, analyses the preferences of the SARB while using a time-varying parameter
approach that may allow one to understand how monetary policy regime changes
have evolved over time.
3.3 The Model
This section presents a baseline open economy model that could be modified to be
consistent with a closed economy model. A structural small open economy model
of Gali and Monacelli (2005) is used. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) discuss a
similar New Keynesian monetary policy structural model. This model is used to
characterise the South African economy. The small open economy model blocks
are as follows:7
πt = βππt+1|t + καyt + µπ,t, (3.1)
πcpit = πt + α(st − st−1) = πt + α(∆st), (3.2)
qt = qt+1|t − (1− α)(it − πt+1|t) + (1− α)(ift − π
f
t+1|t) + (1− α)µq,t, (3.3)
yt = yt+1|t − βρ,t(it − πt+1) + µy,t. (3.4)
Eqn. (3.1) is the aggregate supply function, πt denotes domestic inflation, βπ
is the rate of time preference and yt is the output gap and µπ,t is the supply shock
at time t− k that is not accounted for at time t and has zero mean independently
identically distribution (i.i.d.).
Eqn. (3.2) characterises the consumer price index inflation, where st is the
terms of trade and shows the effect of imported goods on consurmer price inflation.
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domestic expenditure on foreign goods. A larger parameter means that the domestic economy









t+1 are the foreign interest and inflation rates
with zero mean i.i.d and µq,t is the exchange rate risk premia.
Eqn. (3.4) is the aggregate demand function and all the parameters are non-
negative, where ρt = it−πt+1 is the real interest rate and µy,t is the demand shock
with zero mean i.i.d. qt is the real exchange rate and is measured as follows
qt ≡ st + pht − pt = (1− α)st, (3.5)
Eqns. (3.1)- (3.3) of these model blocks collapse to a closed economy model
similar to Clarida et al. (2002) and Woodford (2003a), that is, if either α = 0 or
ωα = ση = 1, then κα =
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ




The optimising central bank intertemporal loss function in an open economy










2 + λi(it+k − it+k−1)2. (3.7)
The parameters λπcpi,t+k, λy,t+k and λi,k−1 are the weights central banks place on
inflation, output stability and interest rate smoothing.
The interest rate smoothing term is added to account for the possibility of
policy authorities’ desire to gradually adjust their policy rates and thus captures
inertia in policy rate adjustments, see Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003a).
Similarly, see also Sack and Wieland (2000), who are critical of the interest rate
smoothing argument. In this case, the dual mandate of the central bank is con-
sumer price inflation and output stability.
All the weights are nonnegative and also time-varying, except for the weight for
the interest rate smoothing. The time-varying concept allows for a departure from
the basic central bank loss function, in that the weight attached to inflation relative
to output stability varies over time.8 There are a number of reasons to model the
8However, here it is assumed that the weight a central bank attaches to interest rate smoothing
does not change over the sample period.
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parameters as time-varying. First, these weights change with a particular central
bank governor or the composition of the monetary policy committee. For example,
a new governor may exhibit an anti-inflation bias, whereas another governor may
accommodate inflation. Secondly, the degree of political pressure on monetary
policy authorities may change central bank preferences. This changing political
pressure can be accounted for by a time variation in the weights the committee
attaches to inflation relative to output stability. Thirdly, periods of economic
uncertainty—such as the Asian currency crisis in 1998 and the global financial
crisis over the period 2007 and 2008—may account for changes in the weights that
a central bank attaches to inflation relative to output stability.
To close the present model, a monetary policy rule that follows a Taylor-type
rule is derived and used to show how a central bank responds to macroeconomic
variables. Eqn. (3.3) is respecified in the form
it − πt+1|t =
1
(1− α)
[qt+1|t − qt] + (ift − π
f
t+1|t) + µq,t, (3.8)
substituting eqn. (3.8) into eqn. (3.4) yield
yt = yt+1|t − βp,t[
1
(1− α)
(qt+1|t − qt) + ift − π
f
t+1|t + µq,t] + µy,t. (3.9)
Further, following Dennis (2007), the foreign interest rate, inflation and exchange
rate risk premium are normalised to zero. Then re-arranged to yield
yt+1|t = yt + βp,t[
1
(1− α)
(qt+1|t − qt)]− µy,t. (3.10)







. Therefore, st and st−1 are replaced with qt and
qt−1, respectively in eqn. (3.2) to yield.
πcpit = πt +
α
1− α




Similarly, eqn. (3.11) is iterated one period ahead and conditional expectations
are taken at time t to yield the following:
πcpit+1|t = πt+1|t +
α
1− α
(qt+1|t − qt). (3.12)
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Eqns. (3.12) and (3.10) are substituted into eqn. (3.7) and using qt+1|t as a control
variable similar to Ball (1999), and the central bank loss function is solved to yield
[qt+1|t − qt] = −
λy,tβp,t





















Eqn. (3.8) thus becomes it−πt+1|t =
1
(1− α)
[qt+1|t− qt], because ift = π
f
t+1|t =



























The parameters in eqn. (3.14) are summarised to yield
































Eqn. (3.15) is the open economy optimal monetary policy rule. This implies
that a central bank adjusts its policy rate on the basis of expected domestic price
inflation, output gap, and innovations hitting the economy. Thus, changes in
policy rate is determined by changes in a structural small open economy model.
Clarida et al. (2002) demonstrate that eqn. (3.15) is an optimal monetary policy
rule and takes the form of a Taylor-type rule.
For lack of quarterly forecast data on inflation and output over the sample
period 1970:Q1 and 2014:Q4, as well as computational convenience, a backward-
looking Taylor-type rule is used. According to McCallum (1999), a policy rule
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with backward features characterise the data well, because informational assump-
tion are more realistic. It is acknowledged that policy authority responds to an
expected inflation and output gap by using a wide array of variables, which have
predictive content about the expected inflation and output gap. Thus two lags of
the policy rate in eqn. (3.15) are taken to account for the interest rate smoothing
in line with Woodford (2003b), who argues that an optimal Taylor-type rule takes
into account an interest rate of recent past levels with approximate lags of two. In
this chapter, however, the primary interest is on the weights central banks put on
inflation relative to output stability. It is further assumed that monetary policy
shocks on inflation and output are subdued after three and two lags. This is in
line with Svensson (1999), who argues that the real policy rate has a longer effect
on inflation than does output. This gives a modified optimal Taylor-type rule of
the form
it = fi1,tit−1 + fi2,tit−2 + fy,tyt + fy1,tyt−1 + fy2,tyt−2
+ fπ,tπt + fπ1,tπt−1 + fπ2,tπt−2 + ξk,t. (3.16)
3.4 Econometric and Estimation Strategies
3.4.1 Econometric Layout
A time-varying parameter model allows for modeling the possibility of changes in
monetary policy preferences that may be influenced by changes in macroeconomic
variables, changes in central bank governors and in lower and upper bounds of
target variables. Here a time-varying parameter approach is used to estimate the
Taylor-type rule in eqn. (3.16). The time-varying monetary policy rule measure-
ment and transition equations are as follows
Xt = Ztβt + εt εt is i.i.d. ∼ N(0, It), (3.17)
βt = βt−1 + ηt ηt is i.i.d. ∼ N(0, Qt). (3.18)
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Eqn. (3.17) is the measurement equation. Where Xt = [it, π
cpi
t , yt] are vec-
tors containing system observed variables with M × 1 dimension, Zt = It ⊗
[it−1, it−2, yt, yt−1, yt−2, πt, πt−1, πt−2] is M×k matrix that defines each time-varying
parameter vector autoregressive equation, and contains two lags of each observed
variable.
Eqn. (3.18) is the transition equation, where βt = [fi,t, fy,t, fπcpi,t] are the
structural parameters of the model. This is similar to an econometric model used
by Primiceri (2005) and Cogley et al. (2010) to account for gradual changes in
monetary policy conduct.9 Thus the estimators βt attach more weights to current
observations than past observations whereas OLS assigns equal weights to all
observations. Therefore, a time-varying parameter generates smooth estimates of
discrete changes, resulting in parameters starting to gradually change before the
actual break date. Thus, it is possible to determine whether the identified changes
are consistent with a discrete break model.
εt = (ξk,t) is a vector of structural innovations with zero mean and a time-





1, where Ht is a







A lower triangular matrix At is specified to simulate the relation of the struc-
tural shocks by recursive identification. At assumes a diagonal element equal to







9 If, however, the changes are discrete jumps for all parameters simultaneously, the time-
varying parameter estimates will not be reliable. Even though this occurs in special cases, the
time-varying parameter can provide a useful approximation when there are discrete jumps.
29
akj,t and hkj,t are assumed to follow a random walk similar to Nakajima et al.
(2011) of the form
akj,t = akj,t−1 + ζt ζt ∼ N(0, S), (3.21)
lnhkj,t = lnhkj,t−1 + σkµt µt ∼ N(0,W ) and j ∈ [yt, πt, it], (3.22)
where akj,t is modeled as a driftless random walk and hkj,t = [hi,t, hy,t, hπ,t] are
vectors of volatilities assumed to evolve as a geometric random walk independent
of each other. ηt, ζt and µt in eqns. (3.18), (3.21) and (3.22) are i.i.d. The variance-
covariance W in eqn. (3.22) depends on the free parameter of σk. A block-diagonal
structure is imposed to make the blocks of E independent to enable the covariance










I3 θ3×21 θ3×3, θ3×3
θ21×3 Q θ21×3 θ21×3
θ3×3 θ3×3 S θ3×3
θ3×3 θ3×3 θ3×3 W

. (3.23)
Once It in eqn. (3.17) and Qt in eqn. (3.18) are specified, prior condition
for the initial values (β0, I0 andQ0) and priors for any remaining parameters of
the model are specified, then Bayesian inference can follow using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC).
3.4.2 Choice of Priors
The MCMC method involves numerical sampling from the posterior distribution
which is carried out through the Kalman filter and the independence Metropolis-
Hastings (MH) algorithms. The Kalman filter is applied to eqns. (3.17) and
(3.18) to obtain the estimates of the time-varying parameter Taylor-type rule in
eqn. (3.16), see Appendix A 3.7.1 for how the algorithm is initiated. What is
new is that the weight attached to each explanatory variable is assumed to vary
over time. As the central bank’s preferences change, the weight attached to each
explanatory variable also changes.
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The independence MH algorithm is implemented to obtain the estimated time-
varying parameter dynamic responses and stochastic volatility. Here, in line with
Jacquier et al. (2002), a brief explanation of the estimation steps is provided and
the generic steps are provided in Appendix A 3.7.2. For the training sample, a
standard time invariant vector autoregression using OLS is estimated. The first ten
years of the observations are used as the training period to obtain the priors. The
priors for the time-invariant parameters are assumed to be normal with the prior
means equal to the OLS estimates for the training sample. The prior variances
are set high enough to make them non-informative.
The prior for Q in eqn. (3.18) captures the variances of the prior preference
parameters and is set to the inverse Wishart distribution. The posterior distri-
bution of Q comes from the same distribution of the prior distribution of Q. A
large value of Q implies more stochastic volatility in the central bank’s preference
parameters. For this reason the scale factor of 0.00035 is set in line with Benati
and Mumtaz (2007). Using that initial data, the starting values for hkj,t in eqn.
(3.22), t = 0...T and k = 1, 2, 3 are obtained as the variances W in eqn. (3.22)
and the priors for σk and µt = 0.0001 with µt in eqn. (3.22) are set as inverse
Gamma distribution. Because the marginal likelihood distributions of µt depend
on unknown means and variances, if the parameters have an inverse Gamma prior
distributions then the conditonal posterior distributions are also inverse Gamma
distribution. The initial values for akj,t in eqn. (3.21) are set equal to the absolute
value of (akj)×10. In eqn. (3.21), the priors for S1 is inverse Gamma distribution







The priors of the policy rate variances εt in eqn. (3.17) are assumed to be
inverse Gamma distribution. The shape and scale parameter of the inverse Gamma
distribution is set to α = 2 and β = 1 to have fairly loose priors. Conditional on
At, Ht, and Qt, using the Carter and Kohn algorithm, the variances of εt changes
at each point in time when the Kalman filter is run.
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This simulation exercise is repeated 100,000 times with a burn-in period of
99,000 being discarded. After discarding the samples in the burn-in period, the
sample paths look stable, as shown in the left and right panels of Figure 3.14 for
the baseline model and robustness check. This implies that the sampling method is
efficient with low autocorrelation. All the estimation results below were, therefore,
based on 1,000 draws of each parameter that follows.
3.4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
South African quarterly data over the period 1970:Q1 to 2014:Q4 and sourced from
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) are used.10 The variables used are
the real GDP growth rate seasonally adjusted, the consumer price index inflation
measured as a percentage change from the corresponding previous quarter, and
the SARB policy rate measured as a per cent per annum, which is the repurchase
rate (repo rate). The real GDP growth rate is used in the baseline estimates. In
the robustness check, the real GDP growth rate is replaced with the output gap,
using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to extract the output gap.
In Table 3.2, when analysing the estimates of the standard deviation and skew-
ness show that the real GDP growth rate is characterised by low volatility relative
to the output gap. This evidence supports the use of the real GDP growth rate in
the baseline estimates instead of the output gap. The use of the real GDP growth
rate is consistent with Orphanides (2001), who argues that ex post revised real
GDP values may provide a misleading description of monetary policy conduct.
A cursory look at the descriptive statistics in Table 3.2 and the evolution of
the variables plot in the bottom panel of Figure 3.1, suggest that movements
in inflation and the repurchase rate are related. The expansion and recovery
dynamics of inflation, the real GDP rate and the repurchase rate are consistent
with the occurrence of global shocks and how the domestic economy was stabilised
by the SARB. Between 1994 and 1998, the repurchase rate rose persistently and
10 See, http://data.imf.org.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of variables of interest
Variables Mean Median Max. Min Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Prob.
Inflation 8.804 9.331 19.250 3.437 5.013 0.042 1.800 0.004
Output gap 0.182 0.214 8.208 -8.266 2.803 0.1335 3.869 0.045
Real GDP 3.210 3.456 9.378 -4.454 2.783 -0.304 2.797 0.214
Repo rate 10.172 9.00 21.250 2.350 4.690 0.403 2.028 0.003
Source: Author’s estimation August 31, 2016. Sample size of 180, starting from
1970:Q1 to 2014:Q4.
peaked in 1998, while the real GDP growth exhibits a downward trajectory. This
is attributed to the 1994 election leading to capital outflows in the South African
economy, and the Asian financial crisis in 1998.
In late 2001, inflation rose significantly and peaked in 2002. It then declined
to an all-time low at the end of 2003. This coincided with the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and resultant depreciation of the South African rand by approximately 20
per cent in nominal terms. The SARB responded by increasing the repurchase
rate cumulatively by 4.00 per cent between December 2001 and September 2002.
Inflation trajectories peaked again in 2008. These also coincided with the financial
crisis in 2008 and rising oil prices from 2006 that peaked in 2008. Responding
to this, the SARB increased the repurchase rate cumulatively by 5.00 per cent
between May 2006 and June 2008. With this trend, real GDP growth rates were
not spared following similar trajectories over the sample period.
To sum up, all these factors may result in the possibility of changes in the
SARB’s policy preferences for inflation relative to output.
3.5 Empirical Results
In this section the results from the Kalman filter and Metropolis-Hastings esti-
mates are reported. Tables 3.3 to 3.5 report the mean parameters of changes in
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SARB loss function parameters, governors’ policy parameters, and counterfactual
model parameters. Table 3.6 of Appendix A 3.7.3 provides detail baseline esti-
mates of SARB loss function parameters for the full sample use to simulate the
path of the counterfactual estimates. The figures are reported in Appendix A 3.7.3.
Figure 3.1 shows the time-varying parameter monetary policy regime changes and
Figure 3.2 and 3.3 report governors’ policy parameters and the central bank policy
parameters of the two regimes. The estimated policy regimes innovations, time-
varying dynamic responses and stochastic volatility of the structural innovations
are shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the robustness check,
whereas the counterfactual simulations are reported in Figures 3.8 to 3.13.
3.5.1 Baseline Results
3.5.1.1 SARB Policy Preferences
In Table 3.3, the magnitudes of inflation and real GDP growth rate parameters are
1.003 and 0.74, respectively over the full sample period. The inflation parameter is
consistent with theory because it is greater than or equal to one (βinf,t ≥ 1). This
implies that the SARB is active in fighting inflation, for the weight allocated to
real GDP growth rate parameter is much greater than 0.50 as proposed by Taylor
(1993). This shows that the SARB is also concerned with stabilising output.
Table 3.3: SARB policy preferences
Inflation Output
Full Sample
Real GDP growth 1.0029 0.744
Output gap 1.3932 -0.3051
Policy Regimes
Monetary aggregates regime 1.1157 0.3831
Inflation targeting regime 0.8574 1.1819
Source: Author’s estimation August 31, 2016
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The preferences of the SARB over inflation relative to the real GDP growth rate
varies, as reported in Table 3.3 and the bottom panel of Figure 3.1. That is, the
path of inflation parameter (βinf,t) and the real GDP growth rate parameter (βgdp,t)
experience significant structural changes. From 1980 to 1998, the SARB followed
Taylor’s prescription of monetary policy conduct with minimal deviations. The
weights attached to inflation and output are 1.12 and 0.38 over the period. When
policy regime changes to inflation targeting, the model parameters of inflation and
output are reversed to 0.86 and 1.18, respectively. Since the inflation parameter is
less than unity, this shows that inflation stability cannot be achieved. The reason
for this is that policy fails to prevent the self-confirmed effects of inflation (see
Clarida et al. (1999)).
Further, this can be attributed to the fact that in an unofficial inflation tar-
geting period, inflation rate was brought down to about 15 percent average in late
1980s and early 1990s. It further declined below the double digit in December
1992 and moved to an average rate of 5.2 percent in 1999. This trend is very
similar to Mariscal et al. (2011), who find that once inflation targeting regime
was announced in the UK, economic agents were hopeful that policy authority
would deliver on its inflation target. When the Bank of England however, failed
to deliver its target within the short term period, economic agents discredited the
Bank’s ability to deliver on the announced inflation target.
When the two figures in Figure 3.1 are compared, it is found that the trajec-
tory of the inflation parameter is similar to future inflation values (πt+1), but its
parameter changes in line with the repurchase rate. Thus, when the repurchase
rate is high, the inflation parameter is also high. In the 1990s, inflation parameters
and inflation values moved in the opposite direction most of the time, especially
from 1990 to 2000. There were, however, small changes recorded around 2000 to
2005. In 1998, the inflation parameter reached its peak at 3.96 during the second
quarter, when the repurchase rate was also at its peak. This was as a result of
exchange rate shocks triggered by the Asian financial crisis over the period 1997
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to 1998.
It can, therefore, be inferred that regime changes have a role to play on the
weights the SARB attaches to inflation and output parameters. The switches in
policy objectives point to the fact that, in future, policy parameters may change
from flexible targeting as witnessed during the 2008 financial crisis in advanced
economies. Similarly, this evidence supports the propositon that output growth
and low inflation volatility is due to better monetary theories, minimal shocks in
the economic environment, and the rule-based monetary policy practice adopted
by the SARB.
3.5.1.2 Governors’ Tenures
The top panel of Figure 3.1 shows that the weight on inflation rises around the
appointment of De Kock. The weight continues to rise to 1.76 in the fourth quarter
of 1984 before declining towards the end of the De Kock tenure, as reported in
Table 3.6 of Appendix A 3.7.3. Though this coincides with political upheavals
and poor sovereign risk rating in the 1980s, the economy was facing large gold
price shocks as well as trade and financial sanctions. When Stals stepped in,
the weight on the inflation parameter rose persistently and continued in the early
years of Mboweni, averaging at 1.59. This is attributed to Stals’s main objective
of controlling inflation and the effects of large capital outflows prior to the 1994
elections.
During Mboweni’s term, the weight on inflation declined until the first quarter
of 2006. The weight on inflation began to rise from 0.02 to 0.59 in the first quarter
of 2008, as shown in Table 3.6 of Appendix A 3.7.3. Further, the Mboweni era
shows that the SARB was more concerned with output growth than inflation
stability. This could be attributed to the fact that between 1989 and 1999 under
Stals’s tenure, the economy recorded an average growth rate of 1.31 per cent
compared to 1.80 per cent average growth rate under De Kock that might have
put pressure on Mboweni to stimulate the economy, as reported in Table 2.2 in
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chapter two.
After Mboweni’s tenure, Governor Marcus assumed office and the weight on
inflation rose relative to output stability. The SARB switched its weights by
allocating larger weights to inflation ranging between 0.66 and 1.23 over the period
of 2009 to 2014 compared to output, which ranged between 0.16 and 0.62 over the
same period as reported in Table 3.6 of Appendix A 3.7.3. Around this period,
global uncertainty increased and this may account for a reversal in the SARB’s
preference for inflation to output. This implies that as economic uncertainty
increases, policy authority pays particular attention to inflation stability relative
to output growth.
Figure 3.2 supports this interesting evidence that when inflation rises, the
weight attached to inflation also rises. What seems most surprising is during
Stals’s tenure, when inflation was declining, the weight attached to the inflation
parameter was relatively high. The repurchase rate is, however, consistent with the
weight on the inflation parameter. That is, when the repurchase rate reached its
peak, the weight on inflation also reached its peak. This evidence is supported in
Table 3.4, where Stals attached 1.59 and 0.38 to inflation and output respectively
over the period 1989 to 1999 compared to Mboweni, who allocated 0.62 and 1.62
for inflation and output over the period 1999 to 2009.
Table 3.4: Governors’ tenures
Inflation Output
Real GDP growth—baseline 1.0029 0.744
De Kock (1981-1989) 0.9198 0.4579
Stals (1989-1999) 1.5864 0.3813
Mboweni (1999-2009) 0.6183 1.6248
Marcus (2009-2014) 0.9146 0.4037
Source: Author’s estimation August 31, 2016
It is also important to note that in an inflation targeting regime, Mboweni and
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Marcus’s preferences for inflation and output are different, as reported in Table
3.4. This suggests that the prevailing economic conditions have larger effects on
the design of monetary policy. This clearly has little evidence to support the
debate that, because policy authorities around the globe adopted sound monetary
policy, that led to stable inflation and output growth over an inflation targeting
regime.
To further understand the role played by the estimated model parameters, the
policy dynamic responses to inflation and output were compared under the tenure
of Mboweni and Stals. In Figure 3.4, a one-time discrete shift with the appoint-
ment of Stals and Mboweni was used. This implies that the SARB preferences
under the Stals and Mboweni term are the same. The plot shows that a one unit
policy shock on inflation in Stals’s tenure was approximately 0.45 compared to
0.25 under Mboweni’s term. The responses to output under the Mboweni term is
approximately 0.60, while under Stals it was about 0.50. The striking feature is
that over an inflation targeting regime, more weight was placed on output relative
to inflation.
In general, it can be deduced that an inflation targeting regime encourages out-
put growth more so than other policy regimes that have been pursued in previous
years.
3.5.1.3 Policy Regimes and Dynamic Responses
The left panel of Figure 3.5 plots the estimated time-varying dynamic responses
and stochastic volatility of the structural innovations. This could be described as
a time-varying uncertainty. According to the estimated volatility in the left panel
of Figure 3.5, uncertainty was high in the early-to-mid 1980s. During the transi-
tion from a monetary aggregates target to an inflation targeting regime, volatility
increases in inflation and policy rate. Afterwards volatility declines considerably
over the inflation target regime. When the monetary policy regime changed from
a monetary aggregates regime to an inflation targeting regime in 2000, uncertainty
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surrounding the real GDP growth rate and the repurchase rate declined. This un-
certainty surrounding the inflation rate declined after 12 quarters in 2003. Table
3.6 reinforces this conclusion, when uncertainty declines in relation to the mag-
nitudes of inflation and output parameters in eqn. (3.16), the SARB targets the
variable that is less prone to uncertainty. Finally, it is also found that, based on
the stochastic volatility of the structural innovations, an effective monetary policy
regime depends on the prevailing economic uncertainty and conditions.
The results from the time-varying dynamic responses in the right panel of Fig-
ure 3.5, suggest that monetary policy conduct evolves in the early 1980s. Monetary
policy shocks to output and inflation vary over the entire sample period. These
estimates tell an interesting story. For example in 2000, the policy responses to
output was high at negative 2, it fell substantially in 2008 and by 2010 the re-
sponses were low at negative 4. Policy shocks to inflation were high in 1995 and
there was a significant decline after 2000 through to 2008 and afterwards an in-
crease in inflation responses. The volatility of the policy rate to structural shocks
reveals two observations. First, it was stable through the 1990s then it rose at the
end of 1998. Secondly, after 1999, there was a sharp decline in volatility of the
policy rate. This is expected, in that policy mistakes of setting the policy rate
may have been reduced. As pointed out by Cogley et al. (2010), policy authorities
in the conduct of monetary policy learn over time how to set the policy rate.
Furthermore, Figure 3.3 reveals an interesting pattern of policy responses to
real GDP and inflation over time. An inflation targeting regime is different, as
the responses to real GDP growth rate are higher than a monetary aggregates
targeting regime. In an inflation targeting regime, the SARB cares more about
real GDP growth than inflation stability. But after the financial crisis in 2008,
the responses of monetary policy to output were smaller, compared to inflation
responses.11
11The results are similar to Lakdawala (2016) and Belongia and Ireland (2016). For example,
in the abstract of Baxa et al. (2014) Contrary to common wisdom, the response becomes less
aggressive after the adoption of inflation targeting suggesting the positive effect of this regime on
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3.5.1.4 Consistency of Baseline Results with Other Policy Regimes
The results for the changes in the SARB loss function parameters are very similar
to those of Lakdawala (2016) and Belongia and Ireland (2016), findings which
relate to the Federal Reserve Board (Fed). According to them, the Fed placed more
weight on output stability relative to inflation stability from 2000 to 2007. It is
found that the behaviour of the SARB monetary policy strategy was similar during
the same period. The emphasis on output stabilisation increased significantly
after inflation targeting from 2000 until 2005, then the trend reversed during the
financial crisis of 2008.
Secondly, the governors’ tenures are also consistent with an outcome that dif-
ferent governors may exhibit different monetary policy conduct. Mboweni’s policy
objectives might be different to those of De Kock and Stals’. The reason is that
each governor faces different economic circumstances during their time in office
that might shape their beliefs about monetary policy conduct. When Mboweni
stepped in, though inflation was accelerating, output growth became a key concern
for policy authorities. Therefore, output stability became an important objective
to policy authorities as uncertainty associated with the state of the economy in-
creased. This finding is also in line with Lakdawala (2016), who finds that there
was a large rise in the weight on inflation with the Federal Reserve Board Chair-
man Volcker’s term, similar to that of Stals’s tenure.
The volatility of the structural innovations and dynamic responses of inflation
and output are very similar to that of Primiceri (2005), Boivin (2005) and Kim
and Nelson (2006) who found that from the middle part of their sample to the end
period, inflation volatility was low. As Boivin (2005) suggest, monetary policy
conduct changed significantly over the last three decades, but the effect of policy
shocks to real activity were weak. This study confirms that the SARB policy
changed over the sample period of 1980 to 2014. Further, Primiceri (2005) finds
anchoring inflation expectations. This result is supported by our finding that inflation persistence
as well as policy neutral rate typically decreased after the adoption of inflation targeting.
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that different variances of policy shocks are important in examining comovements
between inflation and output similar to this study findings. The fact that sim-
ilar findings are obtained from different empirical settings, as well as, different
countries is encouraging.
Another interesting piece of evidence is that this result is consistent with other
studies in South Africa, as shown in Table 3.1. These studies suggest that the
SARB allocates a positive weight to real economic activity during an inflation tar-
get regime. Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) and Naraidoo and Raputsoane (2015)
obtain estimated parameters of 1.11 and 1.43 for inflation while output parame-
ters are 0.27 and 0.60 over their sample period. Conversely, in this study 1.003
and 0.74 for inflation and output are obtained, respectively. Similarly, Alpanda
et al. (2010) find that the SARB’s preferences for inflation and output were 1.42
and 0.29 in their estimated optimal Taylor rule, and Peters (2016) finds that the
SARB attaches significant weight to inflation. This is similar to what is found
when the sample is split into monetary aggregates targeting and inflation target-
ing regimes, as shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3. However, the time-varying
parameter with stochastic volatility estimates reveal an important feature that is
not found in these works cited above. The responses to inflation and output are
both larger, and are important to characterise monetary policy regime changes.
Again, this study unravels the behaviour of changes in the SARB’s preferences in
more interesting ways than that which traditional estimates are unable to discover.
Overall, the characterisation of the changes in central bank policy preferences
is consistent with existing findings on issues of timing of the changes and changes
in the central banks loss function parameters.
3.5.2 Robustness Check
To gain further insight as to how monetary policy regime changes are carried out
by the SARB and to check whether the baseline results are robust, two approaches
are used. First, the output gap is used as an alternative measure of real economic
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activity to output growth. Secondly, the variances of policy shocks are split into
three regimes to be in line with OLS estimates.
3.5.2.1 An Alternative Real Economic Activity—Output Gap
The top panel of Figure 3.6 is considerably different from the top panel of Figure
3.1. Thus, the output gap describes the SARB as an anti-inflation policy au-
thority with negative weight allocated to output growth. However, the remaining
estimates provide evidence that changes in SARB’s loss function parameters were
much more substantial. In the left panel of Figure 3.7, the volatility in the policy
innovations is much larger with respect to the output gap.
The main difference is that the volatility in the output gap is more pronounced
and shows upward movement. The volatility in inflation rates decline consistently
over the sample period, but after 2010 inflation volatility begins to rise. The
results of volatility in policy rate is consistent with the left panel of Figure 3.5.
Similarly, the responses to the output gap, inflation and repurchase rate in the
right panel of Figure 3.5 show identical trends with the right panel of Figure 3.7.
3.5.2.2 Policy Regime Variances
In Figure 3.4, three regimes in the variances of the policy innovations are allowed
for to detect whether the variances differ in policy innovations. The top panel
is the first regime, starting from 1980:Q1 to 1989:Q2. The middle panel is the
second regime starting from 1989:Q3 to 1999:Q3, and the bottom panel is the
third regime from 2000:Q1 to present. The central message is that the variances
of policy innovations are the same, but in 2000 the interval bounds are wide with
respect to output compared to the 1980s and after 1989. In addition, the policy
rate variance to inflation over the period 1980s is approximately negative 0.50
compared to negative 0.45 and 0.25 over 1989 and 2000, respectively. But the
policy rate variance to policy rate remains at approximately 1.50 throughout the
three regimes.
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The conclusion is that the characterisation of monetary policy regime changes
that emanate from the baseline results is robust to policy regime variances and
output gap.
3.5.3 Counterfactual Simulations
In this section, an ex post simulation is undertaken to understand, first, what
would have happened had Governor Stals’s tenure continued? Secondly, it is
supposed there was no policy regime change from a monetary aggregates regime
to an inflation targeting regime in South Africa. Lastly, it is assumed that the
policy authorities in South Africa had not responded to the impact of the financial
crisis.
In answering the first question, inflation and output are simulated based on
average value of the policy preferences over the tenure of Governor Stals. This is
used to transform the observed inflation and output variables. Secondly, policy
shocks are held to be constant, with the view that Stals has an anti-inflation bias.
Figure 3.8 exhibits the simulated path of inflation and output and Table 3.5 shows
the weights allocated to each counterfactual estimate.
Table 3.5: Counterfactual policy preferences
Inflation Output
Baseline—full sample
Real GDP growth 1.0029 0.744
Mboweni’s term (1999-2009) 0.6183 1.6248
Counterfactual preferences
Stals staying on 0.7976 0.7260
No policy regime change 0.8971 0.7875
Financial crisis 0.9458 0.6630
Source: Author’s estimation August 31, 2016
The findings suggest that the simulated path of inflation would have been
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higher along with an increase in output growth, as reported in the bottom panel
of Figure 3.8. The SARB would have attached higher weight to inflation, should
Governor Stals have stayed on, relative to Governor Mboweni. However, the
SARB would have preference for a lower weight on output, which is different
to the baseline results as reported in Table 3.5. The volatility of the structural
innovations reported in the top panel of Figure 3.9 suggests that the dynamic
responses to inflation and output would have been lower, similar to the baseline
results. However, the simulated stochastic volatility pattern in the bottom panel
of Figure 3.9 do not exhibit similar trends. It can, therefore, be inferred that the
structural innovations played a key role in the inflation targeting regime.
The second counterfactual simulation of no policy regime change is performed
under the scenerio of holding the year 2000 sample constant. The notion that
explicit inflation targeting regime communication takes four quarters to adjust
economic agents’ belief is acknowledged. Mean values of the weights over the
monetary aggregates regime are used to adjust inflation and output variables.
The monetary policy rate is adjusted by 100 basis points, similar to Gupta et al.
(2010).
The simulation suggests that the weights on policy preferences and the dy-
namic responses would have been similar to the baseline empirical results with
minimal deviations, as shown in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.10. On the contrary, the
second panel of Figure 3.11 shows that the counterfactual volatility innovations
vary substantially from the baseline findings. This confirms the proposal that the
size of the structural innovations contribute to the design of monetary policy over
the inflation targeting regime.
Lastly, a counterfactual analysis is conducted to assess the impact of the fi-
nancial crisis in 2008. In doing this, the policy shocks impacting on the economy
and the mean values of the model parameters from 2000:Q1 to 2007:Q3 are fixed
to benchmark the credit crisis in August 2007. Figure 3.12 suggests that the crisis
would have had an adverse impact on a simulated path of output relative to in-
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flation, had the SARB not responded. Similarly, the dynamic responses to output
exhibit a drastic fall and an aggressive anti-inflation bias, as shown in the first
panel of Figure 3.13. In the second panel of Figure 3.13, the structural innovations
to inflation suggest persistence compared to the baseline results. This suggests
that the financial crisis in 2008 would have had greater impact on inflation and
output had the SARB not responded to the crisis.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposes that central bank preferences to target inflation and output
vary over time. Moverover, different policy preferences by policy authorities may
coincide with the term of a particular central bank governor. To examine these
changes in central banks’ preferences across time, a time-varying parameter ap-
proach was used, with the aim of revealing if and how the policy preferences have
changed without splitting the sample. This study reveals that the data and the
econometric technique support this proposal. The findings in this chapter support
the fact that the SARB’s loss function parameters change slowly and also coincide
with most significant economic events. Such events include shifts in monetary
policy regimes, different tenures of SARB governors, social unrest and periods in
which the SARB is successfull in reducing inflation along with increase output
growth.
It is found that monetary policy conduct is dynamic because weights attached
to inflation and output are regime dependent. Further, under the tenure of differ-
ent SARB governors, the weights allocated to inflation and output differ. Results
also suggest that the size of the structural innovations volatility account for a
larger part of policy responses to inflation and output. This evidence supports
the argument that low volatility in inflation and output is as a result of mini-
mal disturbances over the inflation targeting regime. Although based on different
empirical approaches and also in different countries, the findings of the present
analysis are comparable with existing research on policy regimes. In particular,
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changes in policy authority preferences is consistent with issues relating to tim-
ing of policy changes and changes in the weights the policy authority allocates to
output and inflation.
Finally, it is important to note that a backward-looking time-varying policy
regime is used. It would be interesting to use a forward-looking model with and
without the interest rate smoothing to understand the monetary policy regime
changes in a forward-looking environment. Secondly, it is important to establish
the role played by changes in central bank policy parameters on economic perfor-
mance. This is examined in chapter four, to determine the role played by changing
in central bank preferences on the evolution of macroeconomic outcomes.
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3.7 Appendix A: Chapter 3
3.7.1 Kalman Filter Algorithm
To estimate a time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR), the
Bayesian statistical inference for βt exploits the Kalman filtering in the following
steps
βt−1|yt−1 ∼ N(βt−1, Vt−1|t−1), (3.24)
where βt−1|t−1, and Vt−1|t−1, are Kalman filtering proceeds using
βt−1y
t−1 ∼ N(βt|t−1, Vt|t−1), (3.25)
where Vt|t−1 = Vt−1|t−1 + Qt, Qt enters the Kalman filtering formulae only at this





Then Qt will be estimated or simulated and λ is a factor 0 < λ ≤ 1. Eqn. (3.26)
is observation j periods in the past with a weight of λj in the filtered estimate of
βt. Eqns. (3.25) and (3.26) means that if λ = 1 then there is a constant coefficient,
implying that Qt = (λ
−1 − 1)Vt−1|t−1. To avoid constant coefficients, λ is set less
than one—for quarterly data λ = 0.99. This results in a fairly stable model with
a gradual change in coefficients that has features similar to those of Cogley and
Sargent (2005).
3.7.2 Independence Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm
For the selection of the densities within a setup of a time-varying parameter VAR,
the generic candidate density is specified below
q(ΦG+1/ΦG) = q(ΦG+1). (3.27)
The full details can be found in Jacquier et al (2002). In general, the acceptance






unlike the random walk MH algorithm, the independence MH algorithm candidate
density generating is tailored to a particular problem at hand. The steps include:
One: setting starting values of the model parameters
Two: drawing a candidate values of the parameters ΦG+1 from the candidate
density generating





Four: if µ ∼ U(0, 1) is less than α retain ΦG+1, otherwise retain the old draw.
Five: repeat the step 2-4 M times and base on inference on last likelihood draws.
3.7.3 Estimated Results
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Table 3.6: Detail baseline policy preference parameters—full sample
Period Inf. Out. Period Inf. Out. Period Inf. Out. Period Inf. Out.
1980:Q1 0.294 0.111 1988:Q4 0.720 0.725 1997:Q2 1.689 0.383 2006:Q1 0.015 1.276
1980:Q2 0.154 0.486 1989:Q1 0.895 0.746 1997:Q3 1.897 0.309 2006:Q2 0.106 1.333
1980:Q3 0.277 0.170 1989:Q2 0.860 0.769 1997:Q4 2.281 0.195 2006:Q3 0.162 1.333
1980:Q4 0.196 0.356 1989:Q3 0.975 0.738 1998:Q1 2.651 0.330 2006:Q4 0.151 1.299
1981:Q1 0.396 0.102 1989:Q4 1.012 0.707 1998:Q2 3.960 -0.447 2007:Q1 0.135 1.289
1981:Q2 0.498 0.039 1990:Q1 1.178 0.519 1998:Q3 2.824 0.622 2007:Q2 0.410 1.215
1981:Q3 0.626 0.217 1990:Q2 1.193 0.512 1998:Q4 2.125 0.698 2007:Q3 0.487 1.255
1981:Q4 0.683 0.204 1990:Q3 1.308 0.450 1999:Q1 1.906 0.416 2007:Q4 0.542 1.244
1982:Q1 0.818 0.482 1990:Q4 1.341 0.442 1999:Q2 1.941 0.476 2008:Q1 0.587 1.221
1982:Q2 1.101 0.153 1991:Q1 1.232 0.359 1999:Q3 1.826 2.130 2008:Q2 0.548 1.217
1982:Q3 1.009 0.314 1991:Q2 1.201 0.390 1999:Q4 1.827 2.126 2008:Q3 0.550 1.217
1982:Q4 1.205 0.110 1991:Q3 1.151 0.399 2000:Q1 1.479 1.845 2008:Q4 0.866 0.992
1983:Q1 1.122 0.317 1991:Q4 1.116 0.398 2000:Q2 0.830 1.793 2009: Q1 1.156 0.512
1983:Q2 0.999 0.399 1992:Q1 1.087 0.408 2000:Q3 0.651 1.779 2009: Q2 1.134 0.562
1983:Q3 1.229 0.439 1992:Q2 1.038 0.407 2000:Q4 0.702 1.793 2009: Q3 1.256 0.462
1983:Q4 1.403 0.526 1992:Q3 1.040 0.405 2001:Q1 0.779 1.797 2009: Q4 1.239 0.451
1984:Q1 1.490 0.742 1992:Q4 1.107 0.255 2001:Q2 0.850 1.833 2010: Q1 1.102 0.156
1984:Q2 1.427 0.554 1992:Q4* 1.226 -0.231 2001:Q3 1.053 1.939 2010: Q2 1.171 0.362
1984:Q3 1.293 0.403 1993:Q1 1.366 -0.089 2001:Q4 1.164 2.028 2010: Q3 1.203 0.491
1984:Q4 1.757 0.258 1993:Q2 1.222 -0.333 2002:Q1 1.034 1.972 2010: Q4 1.144 0.398
1985:Q1 1.554 0.369 1993:Q3 1.356 0.091 2002:Q2 0.728 1.928 2011: Q1 1.073 0.345
1985:Q2 1.443 0.450 1993:Q4 1.292 -0.046 2002:Q3 0.516 1.958 2011: Q2 0.929 0.325
1985:Q3 1.266 0.632 1994:Q1 1.253 -0.037 2002:Q4 0.426 1.992 2011: Q3 0.804 0.337
1985:Q4 0.966 0.535 1994:Q2 1.514 0.355 2003:Q1 0.549 2.075 2011: Q4 0.735 0.333
1986:Q1 0.762 0.473 1994:Q3 1.290 0.437 2003:Q2 0.706 2.211 2012: Q1 0.764 0.328
1986:Q2 0.653 0.500 1994:Q4 1.198 0.336 2003:Q3 0.722 2.486 2012: Q2 0.791 0.353
1986:Q3 0.625 0.484 1995:Q1 1.243 0.376 2003:Q4 0.503 2.973 2012: Q3 0.801 0.361
1986:Q4 0.506 0.454 1995:Q2 1.283 0.365 2004:Q1 0.586 2.493 2012: Q4 0.741 0.379
1987:Q1 0.499 0.456 1995:Q3 1.677 0.677 2004:Q2 0.465 1.912 2013: Q1 0.825 0.372
1987:Q2 0.514 0.476 1995:Q4 2.193 0.342 2004:Q3 0.190 1.409 2013: Q2 0.864 0.416
1987:Q3 0.506 0.477 1996:Q1 2.180 0.302 2004:Q4 -0.032 1.329 2013: Q3 0.656 0.525
1987:Q4 0.540 0.487 1996:Q2 2.194 0.635 2005:Q1 0.021 1.423 2013: Q4 0.688 0.594
1988:Q1 0.541 0.488 1996:Q3 1.797 0.478 2005:Q2 -0.069 1.287 2014: Q1 0.700 0.588
1988:Q2 0.618 0.598 1996:Q4 1.609 0.422 2005:Q3 -0.005 1.312 2014: Q2 0.663 0.617
1988:Q3 0.697 0.676 1997:Q1 1.575 0.434 2005:Q4 0.053 1.378 2014: Q3 0.696 0.581
Source: Author’s estimation August 31, 2016. Note: Inf=inflation and Out=output
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Figure 3.1: Kalman filter estimates of time-varying policy preferences
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Figure 3.2: Governors’ preferences
Note: Top left panel De Kock, top right panel Stals, bottom left panel Mboweni and bottom
right panel Marcus
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Figure 3.3: Policy regime changes preferences
Note: Left panel monetary aggregates targeting and right panel post-inflation targeting
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Impulse response of inflation, 1980:Q1





Impulse response of real GDP, 1980:Q1






Impulse response of repo rate, 1980:Q1






Impulse response of inflation, 1989:Q3





Impulse response of real GDP, 1989:Q3






Impulse response of repo rate, 1989:Q3






Impulse response of inflation, 2000:Q1






Impulse response of real GDP, 2000:Q1





Impulse response of repo rate, 2000:Q1
Figure 3.4: Policy regimes innovations
Note: Impulse response of inflation, output and repo rate to repo rate shock. Left panel
inflation, middle panel real GDP and right panel repo rate
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#10-4 Stochastic Volatility GDP Growth





#10-4 Stochastic Volatility Inflation
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Figure 3.5: Baseline time-varying parameter VAR
Note: Left panel is stochastic volatility of structural innovations and right panel is
time-varying dynamic responses
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Figure 3.6: Robustness check: Kalman filter estimates of time-varying policy prefer-
ences
Note: Top panel is parameter estimates and bottom panel is evolution of observed variables
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#10-4 Stochastic Volatility Outputgap






#10-4 Stochastic Volatility Inflation
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Figure 3.7: Robustness check: time-varying parameter VAR
Note: Left panel is stochastic volatility of structural innovations and right panel is time-vary
dynamic responses
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#10-4Stochastic Volatility Repo Rate
Figure 3.9: Counterfactual simulation of time-varying dynamic responses, assuming
Governor Stals had continued
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#10-4Stochastic Volatility Repo Rate
Figure 3.11: Counterfactual simulation of time-varying dynamic responses, assuming
no monetary policy regime change
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Figure 3.12: Counterfactual simulation of policy preferences, assuming SARB had not















































































#10-4Stochastic Volatility Repo Rate
Figure 3.13: Counterfactual simulation of time-varying dynamic responses, assuming
SARB had not responded to the financial crisis
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Figure 3.14: Recursive means for the key policy parameters
Note: Left panel real GDP growth rate and right panel output gap
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Chapter 4




In chapter three, the questions to whether central bank preferences are associ-
ated with policy regime changes were examined within a time-varying parameter
approach. The results show that the estimated central bank policy parameters ex-
hibit gradual changes before and after an inflation targeting regime. This outcome
points to some possible parameter instability and nonlinearity in policy authority
preferences. To investigate this issue more comprehensively, this chapter examines
the effects of policy regime switches on some of the potential sources of macroe-
conomic fluctuations within a Markov-switching DSGE model.
One strand in the monetary policy literature seeks to understand the main
sources of variability in inflation and output from its steady state. Identifying
these sources remain a challenge as a result of the changing structure of the
economy, changing policy framework, changing volatility and structural breaks
in macroeconomic data. Despite this, monetary policy regime changes have been
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well documented over the last two decades. In the existing literature, thus, two
views have gained prominence, that is, good luck and good policy.
According to the good luck view, vector autoregressive technique analyses of
policy regimes support a stable economic environment which helps to stabilise
inflation and output volatility. Thus, during a period of low inflation, the global
economy experienced minimal shocks and these coincide with trade openness in
the domestic economy.1 On the contrary, the good policy view argues that institu-
tional changes, sound monetary policy, such as an inflation targeting regime and
some economic theory are responsible for low volatility in inflation and output.2
While these studies allow for changes in policy preferences and innovations
compared to traditional econometric methods such as OLS and GMM, it does
not allow for expectation formations that are likely to affect the current decision-
making behaviour of private agents. As a result, Blake and Zampolli (2006),
Liu and Mumtaz (2011), Davig and Doh (2014) and Foerster (2014) use Markov-
switching rational expectations models to examine multiple regime shifts. The key
finding of the above studies is that expectations of future policy regime shifts have
significant effects on macroeconomic outcomes. In South Africa, Balcilar et al.
(2016) use the Markov-switching DSGE model to forecast structural changes in the
South African economy. According to them, the risk-premium shocks have a larger
impact on output, inflation and interest rate, whereas policy shock affect only
inflation. Similarly, the model with switching properties better fit the economy.
An exploratory analysis of the key macroeconomic variables in the South
African economy indicates that there are spikes in the data. Figure 4.1 exhibits
considerable changes in the consumer price index inflation, output gap, and policy
rate after the adoption of monetary aggregates regime in 1986.
1See, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Sims and Zha (2006), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2007) and Boivin et al. (2010).



















































































































































































































































































Figure 4.1: Observed variables use in this study
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The other variables, such as real consumption and the exchange rate also witnessed
various upswings and downswings. Gold exports followed with erratic swings that
are expected to affect South Africa’s macroeconomic performance. When the
South African Reserve Bank officially adopted inflation targeting in 2000, the
policy rate experienced remarkable reduction and then stabilised in 2005. It rose
in 2008 during the global financial crisis, as shown in Figure 4.1. Therefore, the
question that emerges is: do the changes in policy preferences explain changes in
inflation and output fluctuations? If these are positive, then how do the variances
in policy shocks impact on macroeconomic variables?
These questions motivate an examination as to whether the South African
economy is characterised by policy regime changes using a regime-switching small
open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. This helps
to identify how policy regime changes have affected macroeconomic dynamics in
South Africa. The effects of primary commodity export shocks on macroeconomic
outcomes, such as inflation, output and policy rate are also addressed. Here, the
role of primary commodity exports is incorporated, first, in the form of gold ex-
ports, then a merchandise exports. This, therefore, determines the changes to the
dynamic responses of the variables in the system. This deepens the understanding
of policy regime shifts on macroeconomic performance in small open economies
that export primary commodities.
Although Blake and Zampolli (2006), Liu and Mumtaz (2011), Alstadheim
et al. (2013), and Bianchi et al. (2014) allow for changes in policy shocks and
transition probabilities in their analysis, this chapter differs because it allows for
primary export innovations in a regime dependent framework. This is relevant
for this study, because one of the factors accounting for low growth in emerging
economies, especially South Africa, is weak global demand and lower prices of key
export commodities, such as gold, copper, iron and platinum (SARB (2016)). Most
literature neglects the role of primary commodity exports within a setup of policy
regime switches, either for small developed economies or in emerging economies
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(see Seoane (2011), Alstadheim et al. (2013), Blagov (2016) and Gonçalves et al.
(2016)).
This chapter follows Nimark (2009) and uses a structural small open economy
model that characterises the salient features of the South African economy. How-
ever, the Taylor-type rule in Nimark (2009) model is modified to account for the
exchange rate disconnect puzzle and then Markov-switches are introduced into the
model. This model is solved using Maih (2015) efficient perturbation algorithm
and carrying out Bayesian inference with data covering the period 1981:Q1 and
2016:Q3. In summary, the study finds that an increase in external shocks and
its volatility have a larger role to play in monetary policy analyses in emerging
economies compared to only using policy shocks and its volatility. The results
suggest that volatilities in structural innovations are the main drivers of economic
performance and better fit the economy. Moreover, the model that includes pri-
mary commodity export sector shocks in the form of gold exports outperforms
the ones that do not capture commodity export shocks. Another result is that
the structural parameters are not constant. Following a change in the variances
of the structural innovations, the parameters of the structural model keep shift-
ing. This result is related to the views of Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2007), who
suggest that there is evidence of parameter drifting in the structural model over
their sample period.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In sections two and three,
related literature and modeling strategy are provided. Outlined in section four is
a regime-switching DSGE environment that includes a generic framework, stability
solution and estimation methods, as well as data, priors and number of Markov
switches in this model. In section five, the empirical results are provided. This is
followed by the conclusion of the discussion in section six.
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4.2 Literature Review
This chapter is related to parameter instability literature of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models. This strand of the literature includes early research
by Laforte (2005), Rubio-Ramirez and Fernéndez-Villaverde (2007) and Justini-
ano and Preston (2010), who use DSGE models with stochastic volatility in the
structural innovations. They find considerable evidence that the parameters are
nonconstant. Castelnuovo et al. (2014) examine policy regime swtiches and time-
varying inflation trends with volatility shocks in a unifying model. According to
them, a time-varying policy switching model is more tractable as compared to a
constant policy regime model. Related findings are documented in Ferman (2011),
Bianchi et al. (2014) and Debortoli and Nunes (2014).
Alstadheim et al. (2013) recently considered a Markov-switching DGSE model
that endogenises the nominal exchange rate. They solve the model using a pertur-
bation method and carry out estimations through Bayesian inference. According
to them, the magnitude of policy shocks and structural parameters in relation to
Canada, Norway, Sweden and the U.K. vary over their sample period. Similarly,
Chen and MacDonald (2012) used U.K. dataset over the past 35 years to exam-
ine changes in the economy using a Bayesian technique. In their paper, they find
that policy rule parameters, price indexes, and exogenous shocks experience major
variations.
These studies have convinced the writer that policy regime switches are an
important characteristics of macroeconomic data. However, the studies by Alstad-
heim et al. (2013) and Chen and MacDonald (2012) use Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) model, whose features are restrictive in nature to characterise emerging
economies. The model assumes the existence of a complete financial market and
with minimal shocks. Therefore, a structural small open economy model that
characterises the features of emerging economies to quantify the effect of policy
regime switches is required. This thesis’s contribution to this literature is the
introduction of shocks unique to the South African economy that depends on pri-
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mary commodity exports with incomplete financial market. This could also apply
to other emerging economies.
In emerging economies Seoane (2011) uses a Markov-switching DSGE model
to examine the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy, and Blagov (2016)
investigates the sensitivity of a currency board and policy credibility of the Estonia
policy authority. Seoane (2011) finds that an active monetary policy in the 1980s
and 1990s lasted in short periods of a two-year interval in instances when there
was an economic crisis. Consequently, a policy shift from active fiscal policy to
active monetary policy resulted in high output losses. Blagov (2016) finds that
a stable currency board helps mitigate the adverse effect of risk premia in the
long run. It is important to note that these studies do not consider policy regime
switches with a primary commodity export sector that is essential in emerging
economies. This chapter fills the gap in this part of the literature.
This thesis is related to studies that look at the literature that examines cen-
tral bank responses to inflation, output and exchange rate in South Africa. This
includes Steinbach et al. (2009), Alpanda et al. (2010) and Peters (2016). Ac-
cording to them, the SARB does not attach significant weight to the exchange
rate, instead it attaches greater weight to inflation variability relative to output.
Although these results are encouraging, they are based on a constant parameter as-
sumption that may show bias in their results. Nevertheless, during certain regimes
policy innovations may change, which may influence the dynamics of macroeco-
nomic outcomes. For these reason this chapter revisits these studies to establish
whether in a regime-dependent state the SARB policy conduct is different from
their findings.
The method used in this chapter is an algorithm that is related to the solution
methods of Davig and Leeper (2007), Foerster et al. (2014), Farmer et al. (2015),
Maih (2015) and Bianchi and Melosi (2016). Bianchi and Melosi (2016) derive a
solution method for rational expectation models that agent beliefs are subject to
varying states, such as good, bad and uncertain states that impact on macroe-
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conomic performance. According to them, the algorithm is superior because it
can account for slow and sudden changes in agent beliefs and uncertainty. In this
thesis the efficient perturbation algorithm of Maih (2015) is followed because it is
superior in solving log-linearised rational expectations models. More importantly,
this solution method identifies sufficient conditions for determinacy in a mean
square stability of rational expectations models. This is different from Davig and
Leeper (2007) and Farmer et al. (2015) solution methods that generate multiple




The model setup used here is adopted from Nimark (2009), a structural small
open economy model applied to the Australian economy. This model is, however,
presented somewhat differently in this work, for the monetary policy rule is allowed
to account for the exchange rate that is a major characteristics of the South
African economy. This model has three properties that satisfy the requirements
needed to address the questions set out in this chapter. First, the South African
economy is described as a structural small open economy. Secondly, the model
theoretical framework is simple to follow and provides for adequate dynamics to
empirically test important monetary policy theses. Thirdly, a number of frictions
are introduced in domestic and imported goods inflation and consumer utility
function, as well as exogenous export demand shocks to characterise the South
African economy and risk premia shocks to induce a smooth steady state.
Further, this model accounts for primary commodity exports sector and foreign
shocks to the domestic economy. These features describe the South African econ-
omy as a price taker in its primary commodity exports in the international market.
In South Africa, merchandise trade is driven by primary commodities that con-
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stitute more than half of exports while half of imported goods are manufactured
goods.3
There are four economic agents in this model, namely the policy authority,
aggregation sectors, representative consumers and the rest of the world. The policy
authority sets the policy rate to follow a Taylor-type rule. The nominal exchange
rate depreciation is introduced in the representative consumers’ budget constraint
through the international securities market. In addition, the exchange rate affects
commodity exporters via the world relative prices of primary commodity exports
channel and profits of firms that import goods.
The aggregators consist of domestic producers, importers and primary com-
modity exporters. The domestic producers produce differentiated goods in a mo-
nopolistically competitive market. The goods can be exported or sold in the
domestic market. In this case, firms charge a mark-up over marginal cost as a
result of consumer preferences for different bundles of goods and some market
power over the price of goods firms sell. In this model, the commodity export
demand sector is characterised by exogenous export shocks and export income
shock steming from a variablility in world commodity prices.
Representative consumer preferences are governed by domestic and imported
production goods as well as labour supply. The rest of the foreign economy is
large and is considered exogenous to the domestic economy.
4.3.2 Extract of the Model
In what follows, the important parts of the log-linearised model that are relevant
to this study are provided.4 In this model, the primary commodity export demand
sector is given in eq. (4.1) as
xet = y
fy
t − δepwt + zet, (4.1)
3http://tradestats.thedti.gov.za/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx




t , zet] are total primary commodity exports, foreign output and
commodity exports shock process, respectively. δe is price elasticity of commodity
export demand and pwt is relative prices of world primary commodity exports
which takes the form
pwt = πt − πfit −∆st + pwt−1, (4.2)
where [πt, st, π
fi
t ] are consumer price index inflation, terms of trade and foreign
inflation rate. The shock to commodity export income equation in Nimark (2009)
is shut due to computational complexity.
Regarding monetary policy, the policy authority sets a Taylor-type rule that
takes into account exchange rate deviations to address the exchange rate discon-
nect puzzle.5 In this way, this chapter departs from Nimark (2009) setup of the
policy rule that does not account for the nominal exchange rate depreciation.
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr)[γ1πt + γ2yt + γ3∆et] + σer, (4.3)
where [rt, et, σ
er] are policy rate, nominal effective exchange rate depreciation
and policy rate shocks. The parameters [ρr, γ1, γ2, γ3] control the degree to which
policy rate adjusts to interest rate smoothing, deviations in consumer price index
inflation, the output gap, and the nominal exchange rate. These show that the
interest rate smoothing term in the policy rule ranges [0 < ρr < 1] and the policy
rule parameters ranges [γ1, γ2, γ3 ≥ 0].
In eq. (4.3), yt is domestic output that links both the direct effect from the
terms of trade and an indirect effect that operate through the market clearing
condition given in eq. (4.4) as
yt = (1− α)ct + α[ω(st + qt) + yfyt ], (4.4)
eq. (4.4) is made up of domestic consumption (ct), terms of trade (st), real ex-
change rate (qt) and foreign output, while ω is the elasticity of substitution between
5The exchange rate disconnect puzzle refers to the missing link between the predictability of
the exchange rate and some key economic fundamentals, such as output growth, interest rates,
relative prices, forward rates and money.
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home and foreign goods and α is the share of foreign goods in consumption.
In this model, the uncovered interest rate parity condition is similar to Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2003) and Justiniano and Preston (2010). They motivate an
imperfect international securities market between foreign and domestic bonds,
thus the uncovered interest rate parity condition is as follows in eq. (4.5)
qt = qt+1|t − (rt − πt+1|t) + (rfrt − π
fi
t+1|t) + κbt + zqt, (4.5)
where [rfrt , bt, κ, zqt] are foreign interest rate, net foreign debt position, debt elas-
ticity with respect to interest rate risk premia and risk premia shock process.










(rt − πt+1|t + zdt), (4.6)
where [ct, zdt] are real household consumption and preference shock processes.
[λ, τ ] are the degree of habit formation and elasticity of intertemporal substitution.










[ψ ∗ yt − (1 + ψ) ∗ zpt + α ∗ st
+ (
τ
(1 + β ∗ δh) ∗ (1− λ)
)(ct − λ ∗ ct−1)], (4.7)
where πht is domestic inflation and zpt is the technology shock process. The struc-
tural parameters are δh—price index for home-produced goods, and φh—price
adjustment cost for home-produced goods. β is the representative consumers’
subjective discount factor and ψ is the inverse elasticity of labour supply.








(1− φf )(1− φfβ)
φf (1 + βδf )
[qt − (1− α)st] + zst,
(4.8)
where πft represents imported inflation and zst is the import-cost inflation shock
process. δf is a fraction of importing firms that reset prices according to Calvo
(1983) pricing. When a fraction of firms do not adjust prices, δf tends to 0, then
deviations from the law of one price becomes smaller. φf is a fraction of importers
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that do change prices while the other fraction (1−φf ) uses the rule of thumb price
setting. Therefore, the consumer price inflation is given in eq. (4.9) as
πt = απ
h
t + (1− α)π
f
t . (4.9)




t ] follow autoregressive
processes of order one [AR(1)]. In this model, the innovations of interest are nine
and evolve as AR(1) processes. These include monetary policy shock, preference
shock, technology shock, imported cost inflation, export shock, risk premia shock,
foreign interest rate shock, foreign inflation shock and foreign output shock. The
rest of the model equations are presented in Table 4.5 of Appendix A 4.7.1.
Regime switches are introduced into eqs. (4.1) to (4.9), the remaining equations
in Table 4.5 and all the innovations are regime-dependent.
4.4 A Regime-Switching DSGE Environment
This section provides a generic framework, solution method and estimation strat-
egy of a regime-switching DSGE model. The estimations in this thesis are carried
out through RISE, a MATLAB package that has been designed to solve and esti-
mate regime-switching DSGE models.6 This environment characterises a rational
expectation model in which changes in policy parameters are allowed to influence
the formation of expectations by private agents. When policy regime changes over
time, the regime-switching rational expectations model allows private agents to
take those changes into account. A simple conjecture is that if a cental bank reacts
more aggressively to inflation, private agents may take into account these expec-
tations about future inflation changes. This information may be able to stabilise
inflation and output, even before the actual policy takes effect, because of ei-
ther wage setting under diferent price expectations or price setting under different
marginal cost facing the firm.
6RISE refers to the Rationality in Switching Environment software developed by Maih (2015).
This package can be obtained from https://github.com/jmaih/RISEtoolbox.
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4.4.1 Generic Framework and Solution Method
It is assumed that the variances of all the variables and shock processes follow a
regime-dependent state Markov chain parameters (st). In this vein, the transition





where P1,2 = prob(st+1 = 2|st = 1) is transition probability from state 1 to state
2. This follows that the small open economy dynamic general equilibrium model
with regime-switching has a state space representation of the form
υ ≡ [bt+1(yt+1), ft+1(yt+1), st(yt), pt(yt), bt(yt), ft(yt), pt−1, bt−1, εt, θyt+1 ]‘, (4.11)
where bt is an mb × 1 vector of forward and exogenous variables, ft is mf × 1
forward looking variables, pt is mp × 1 vector of exogenous variables, st is ms × 1
vector of current variables , εt is mε × 1 vector of innovations and θyt+1 is mθ × 1
a vector of the matrices with switching parameters in the model.
Following the seminal contribution of Davig and Leeper (2007), Markov-switching
rational expectations research has become a popular field in macroeconometrics.7
For example, Foerster et al. (2014), Farmer et al. (2015), Maih (2015) and Cho
(2016) have found new solution methods to this class of models. Thus, the popular
Klein (2000) and Sims (2002) algorithms are no longer suitable to solve this class
of models.
This chapter, therefore, uses the solution method developed by Maih (2015).8
The algorithm is an efficient perturbation method for solving regime-switching
rational expectations models that allow one to determine a single equilibrium con-
dition relevant for economic analysis. This is an improvement over the minimal
7They find that determinancy condition for regime switching equilibria depend on curent
regime and shocks
8 This model accounts for lagged endogenuous variables and regime switches that depend on
current and future regimes. Further, the model is suitable for log-linearised rational expectations
models, where private agent parameters are allowed to switch across regimes.
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state variable algorithm proposed by Farmer et al. (2015).9 The efficient pertur-
bation method algorithm is applied on eqs. (4.1)- (4.9) leading to eq. (4.11) to
group the parameters into lagged, current as well as forward-looking endogenous
and exogenous variables. The next step is to estimate the first-order perturbation
solution to yield regime-dependent solution of the form
Υyt ≡ Υyt(zyt) + Υyt(zt − zt), (4.12)
where Υyt is the approximation rule and zt = [pt−1, bt−1, θ, εt] is mz × 1 vector of
state variables. zt is steady state values of the state variables and θ is a vector of
the perturbation parameters.
4.4.2 Estimation
The next step in the investigation is the estimation of the observed variables.
The estimation strategy is carried out by Bayesian inference through a Markov-
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). In particular, the random walk Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm is used, because in estimating DSGE models some of the conditional
distributions are not obtainable in closed form (see Herbst and Schorfheide (2015)).
The parameters of the prior distribution are set and a new set of parameters is
drawn from the random walk candidate density. Thereafter, the likelihood and
the prior distribution at the draw value of the parameters are evaluated with the
aim of generating the posterior distribution and estimating the marginal density
from the data.
Here the Kalman filter algorithm is not appropriate, so the Kim filter algorithm
is adopted. The Kim filter is suitable in a large set of Markov-switching DSGE
models to compute the posteriors and marginal densities. The Kim filter is a
combination of the Kalman and Hamilton filters, where the possible paths are
9 Davig and Leeper (2007) and Farmer et al. (2015) solution algorithms generate multiple
equilibria in that when one regime produces more volatility relative to the other regime, this
results in indeterminacy.
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collapsed through averaging at each step of the likelihood (Kim and Nelson (1999)).
This keeps the computation of the likelihood tractable.
In all, 20 equations with 51 variables made up of lags, forward looking and
current endogenous and exogenous variables were estimated.
4.4.3 Data
In this chapter, nine observed variables at quarterly frequency from 1981:Q1 to
2016:Q3 are used. The sample period was chosen to cover the period prior to
the adoption of a monetary aggregates regime in 1986. The domestic observed
variables are six, and consist of real GDP seasonally adjusted, real household con-
sumption expenditure seasonally adjusted, gold exports seasonally adjusted as a
proxy for primary commodity exports, policy rate(repo rate), consumer price index
inflation, and a nominal effective exchange rate. The foreign observed variables
relate to the U.S. and are foreign interest rate, foreign output and foreign infla-
tion. The remaining variables in the model are unobserved. CPI inflation, policy
rate, foreign inflation, foreign interest rate and foreign output are sourced from
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The rest of the observed
variables are obtained from the South African Reserve Bank database.
Inflation is consumer price index inflation measured on a quarterly basis. The
nominal effective exchange rate is quarterly percentage changes in the South
African rand measured as a trade-weighted average of twenty major trading part-
ners of South Africa. Regarding foreign interest rate, inflation and output, we use
the U.S.-three month Treasury bill, consumer price index inflation and the real
GDP seasonally adjusted.
All the series were transformed into their growth rates by taking the natural log
difference of the series and multiplying them by 100 to standardise the variables
except policy rate and foreign interest rate. The policy rate and foreign interest
rate are measured as per cent per annum. These are converted into quarterly
averages as log(1 +
policyrate
400
). With respect to domestic and foreign output, the
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output gaps are extracted using the HP filter.
4.4.4 Priors and Markov Switches
This section presents the number of Markov switches introdued into the model
and priors of the structural and policy regime switches. In the Markov switches,
a constant regime is allowed for, as is volatility in the structural shocks only,
policy shocks only, simultaneous volatility in structural and policy shocks, and
independent volatility in structural and policy shocks.
Following this, statistical estimates are used to attach values to the model
structural parameters. The discount factor (β) was fixed at 0.97, which translates
into a long run annual average real interest rate of 3.09 per cent. The intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution of labour supply (ψ) is set at 1.30 to ensure that
workers are willing to increase the number of hours worked in respond to tempo-
rary changes in wages. Debt elasticity with respect to interest rate risk premia
(κ) is fixed at 1.45 per cent, which gives a default spread of 145 basis points as
estimated by Allan Haung country risk premiums.10 The share of foreign goods
in consumption (α) and price elasticity of primary commodity exports (δe) are
set to 0.24 and 0.14 respectively, based on a five-year average concentration and
diversification indices from UNCTAD.11
The elasticty of substitution between home and foreign goods (ω) is set to
1.5, in that the markup for South Africa is comparable to the U.S. and euro
area estimates, as established by Burger and Du Plessis (2013). Justiniano and
Preston (2010) results are followed, and the underlisted parameters are fixed at
0.5. These are price indexation for home and foreign produced goods (δh, δf ),
price adjustment-cost for home and foreign produced goods (φh, φf ) and degree
of habit formation in consumption (λ) and elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(τ).
It is assumed that the prior distributions of policy parameters switches, the
10This can be assessed from www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/econ202/risk.htm.
11 unctad.org/en/pages/statistics.aspx
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priors for regime 1 and regime 2 are different as a result of money target and
inflation targeting regimes. In particular, it is assumed that in regime 1, the
prior responses are low for inflation and output, while in regime 2 the responses
are high.12 The responses to exchange rate depreciation and the macroeconomic
condition index are high in regime 1 and low in regime 2. The prior choice for
the regimes are in line with Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) and Peters (2016).
According to them, the SARB targets the exchange rate prior to an inflation
targeting regime while in post inflation targeting regime it does not target the
exchange rate. Priors for the policy smoothing parameter (ρr) is set at 0.60 and
policy innovations (σer) is set at 0.15. The priors for the transition matrice are
set to 0.95 in each regime, based on Bianchi (2012), who states that regimes are
persistent.
Further, it is assumed that the economy faces primary commodity export
switches in innovations. In regime 1, the economy faces relatively low volatility in
primary commodity innovations (σee), with prior distributions of 0.37. While in
regime 2, the economy faces high volatility with prior distribution of 0.87 in line
with Nimark (2009). In addition, the prior distributions of the structural shocks
processes follow beta distribution with values of 0.60. The priors for the variances
in structural innovations follow a Weibull distribution with values of 0.18.
Following Liu et al. (2011) and Bjørnland et al. (2016), there is a departure from
the normal practice of the direct usage of prior means and standard deviations,
and this study uses quantiles distribution of the statistical estimates of the prior
means to recover the hyperparameters with 90 percent probability interval of the
distributions.13
12These formulation of the regime hypotheses are based on the evidence experienced in the
South African economy or in other emerging economies instead of advanced economies.
13See, Gelman et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion and treatment of this approach. Similarly,
see Gelman et al. (2014) pp.11 for the exposition on the credible intervals of the posterior
densities, model checking and improvements.
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4.5 Empirical Results
In this section, estimates of the Markov-switching DSGE model are reported.
First, the model comparison results are presented to help select the best fit spec-
ification and also ensure that only the model that best fit the data is discussed.
Following this, a detailed account of the parameter estimates and the smoothed
transition probabilities is given. Thereafter, the robustness of the baseline model
used is evaluated relative to alternative specifications. Finally, some light is shed
on the generalised dynamic responses, variance and historical decompostions to
determine various contributions of the shocks to the economy.
4.5.1 Model Comparison
In this subsection whether the data fit a particular model based on alternative
specifications is investigated. This is done using the Akaike information criterion
(AICc), Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the log marginal data densities.
Based on the log posterior densities reported in Table 4.1, the data is adjusted to
obtain the AICc and BIC.
The model with volatility in structural shocks only has the lowest AICc and
BIC scores indicating that this model is parsimonious for the South African econ-
omy. There is strong evidence in favour of the model with switches in volatility
in the structural innovations only relative to policy only and a constant model, as
shown in Table 4.1.
Next, the marginal likelihood, that is, the log-marginal data densities (log-
MDD) is used to characterise the estimated DSGE model that best fits the data—the
model with the largest marginal likelihood is considered as the best fit model, as
reported in Table 4.1. The model with volatility in structural shocks only contin-
ues to outperform policy shocks volatility and the constant DSGE model. This
result is similar to the finding of Liu et al. (2011) for the U.S. economy. To validate
the results, a number of robustness tests were run to determine the appropriate-
ness of the best fit model. In Table 4.4, it is seen that the model with volatility
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Table 4.1: Statistics for model comparison
Constant VolPolSame VolPolInd. VolOnly PolOnly
BIC 4025.18 39545.52 507480.22 3694.32 3921.72
AICc 3948.09 39459.89 507480.22 3584.26 3837.74
Log-posterior -1930.75 -19656.20 -253618.59 -1738.04 -1866.62
Log-lik -1801.89 -19618.26 -253617.24 -1679.07 -1792.15
Log-prior -128.86 -37.94 -1.3533 -58.97 -74.47
Log-MDD(Laplace) -2176.10 -19930 -253920.87 -1926.40 -2083.49
Note: Constant=structural shocks and policy parameters are time-invariant;
VolPolSame=structural shocks and policy parameters switch simultanteous;
VolPolInd=structural shocks and policy parameters switch independent;
VolOnly=only volatility in the structural shocks are regime switching;
PolOnly=policy parameters only are regime switching.
in structural shocks only continues to outperform all the alternative robustness
check specifications.
This suggests that the regime-switching DSGE model with volatility in struc-
tural innovations only is preferred to either policy only switches or constant DSGE
models. This, further, means that policy authorities should pay attention to vari-
ances emanating from structural shocks compared to shocks hitting the economy
from policy innovations only. Following this, the results in relation to policy shocks
only, combined and independent volatility in structural and policy shocks switches
only are not discussed. The results are, however, provided for interested readers
to make their own judgement in Appendix B 4.7.2.
4.5.2 Parameter Estimates
Estimates of the simulations are reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. First, the constant
DSGE model is examined. This is followed by an examination of what is here
considered as best fit model that is the volatility in structural innovations only
82
DSGE model.
Table 4.2 shows the posterior mode of the structural and innovation process
parameters. The estimates of the constant DSGE model are reported in column
Table 4.2: Posterior mode of structural and shock process pa-
rameters
Prior Posterior
Par. Distr. 5% 95% Constant Volatility 5% 95%
λ G 0.54 1.50 0.014 0.12 0.06 4.59
τ G 0.54 1.50 1.93 1.17 0.06 4.59
α G 0.54 1.50 0.12 0.09 0.06 4.59
ω G 0.54 1.5 1.54 1.23 0.06 4.59
β B 0.10 2.00 0.06 0.22 0.18 3.94
φh G 0.58 1.00 0.008 0.10 0.25 1.58
φf G 0.58 1.00 1.41 1.22 0.25 1.58
δh G 0.54 1.50 1.92 0.21 0.06 4.59
δf G 0.54 1.50 0.05 0.01 0.06 4.59
δe G 0.54 1.50 0.003 0.012 0.06 4.59
ψ G 0.54 1.50 1.65 1.18 0.06 4.59
κ G 0.05 1.50 0.001 0.002 0.001 1.58
ρd B 0.05 0.90 0.81 0.86 0.28 8.97
ρs B 0.05 0.90 0.89 0.83 0.28 8.97
ρz B 0.05 0.90 0.96 0.85 0.28 8.97
ρq B 0.05 0.90 0.96 0.93 0.28 8.97
ρe B 0.05 0.90 0.98 0.99 0.28 8.97
ρfi B 0.05 0.90 0.19 0.21 0.28 8.97
ρfy B 0.05 0.90 0.86 0.80 0.28 8.97
ρfr B 0.05 0.90 0.45 0.61 0.28 8.97
Note: B=Beta distribution, G=Gamma distribution. See Gelman
et al. (2014) pp.11 for exposition on why some of the posterior
densities may be outside the Bayesian credible intervals.
5 of Table 4.2. It is revealed that the structural parameters are very similar
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to Alpanda et al. (2010), who use a similar model to examine the responses of
the SARB to exchange rate and other marcoeconomic variables. Although there
are slight variations in the estimations as shown here, this may reflect the wider
coverage of the data sample that includes the 1980s and the financial crisis in
2008 and beyond. The posterior mode for the inverse elasticity of labour supply
(ψ) is 1.65, which is much higher than 1.45 for Alpanda et al. (2010) and 1.59 for
Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). This may be due to the inclusion of the primary
export sector explicitly in the model, coupled with a long period sample coverage.
The estimated posterior mode for habit formation in consumption (λ) is 0.014,
which is much lower than the 0.83 that was reported in Alpanda et al. (2010) for
South Africa and the 0.81 that was reported in Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) for
the US. Similarly, the lower impact of habit formation in consumption is slightly
far from a median value of 0.14 that was reported by Liu and Mumtaz (2011) who
use Markov-switching model for the U.K. economy.
Another feature of constant DSGE model estimates is that the shocks processes
exhibit quite a high degree of persistence, except for foreign interest rate (ρfr) and
foreign inflation (ρfi) shock processes, with an estimated posterior mode of 0.45
and 0.19, respectively. The estimated posterior mode for the share of foreign goods
in domestic consumption (α ) is 0.12. This suggests that trade policy pursued in
the South African economy is less outward oriented. The estimated posterior mode
for price adjustment cost for home (φh) and foreign produced goods φf are about
0.01 and 1.41, respectively. This may imply that home-produced goods adjust
faster relative to price adjustment cost for foreign-produced goods. Contrary, the
estimated posterior mode of price indexation for home-produced goods (δh) exhibit
more stickness than foreign produced goods (δf ). It can thus be concluded that
the price adjustment cost for home-produced goods and the price indexation for
foreign-produced goods have a long run pass-through effect as compared to price
indexation for home-produced goods and price adjustment for foreign-produced
goods.
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Next, the estimated posterior modes of the policy parameters and the struc-
tural innovations for the Constant DSGE model are reported in column 5 of Table
4.3. The estimated policy parameters reveal that policy authorities respond sig-
nificantly to inflation (γ1) relative to output (γ2) and exchange rate depreciation
(γ3). Another revealing feature is that inflation and output parameters of 1.26
and 0.63 are similar to Steinbach et al. (2009) values of 1.39 and 0.63 for inflation
and output, respectively, although they did not take into account the exchange
rate depreciation in their policy rule. The weights on inflation vis-a-vis output
and exchange rate depreciation reflect the fact that the SARB is more responsive
towards consumer price inflation variability relative to output volatility and ex-
change rate depreciation. It can also be concluded that policy authorities have
a lower preference for exchange rate depreciation. The computed exchange rate
posterior mode weight of 0.31 is slightly higher than the median value of 0.25
computed by Alpanda et al. (2010).
The estimated posterior mode for policy smoothing parameter (ρr) and its
shock variances are 0.89 and 0.36 respectively. These are related to the esti-
mates of Alpanda et al. (2010) of 0.92 and 0.24 for policy smoothing and its
shock variances. The implication is that policy authorities prefer to stabilise pol-
icy rate smoothing to keep the inflation targeting regime credible. The variances
of imported-cost inflation (σs), preference (σd) and foreign inflation (σfi) shocks
are quite high, compared to technology (σz) and export (σe) shock variances as
reported in Table 4.3. This may reflect the fact that the shocks hitting the South
African economy are driven by import-cost inflation, preference and foreign infla-
tion shock variances.
The volatility in structural innovations only DSGE model, herein the preferred
model, is considered below. The results are displayed in column 6 of Tables 4.2
and 4.3. These results are very similar to the ones obtained in the constant DSGE
model reported in column 5 of Tables 4.2 and 4.3. However, there are some im-
portant distinctions that need mention. Most of the estimated posterior modes
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Table 4.3: Posterior mode of policy parameters and structural
innovations
Prior Posterior
Par. Distr. 5% 95% Constant Volatility 5% 95%
ρr B 0.60 0.90 0.89 0.98 0.48 3.97
γ1 G 2.19 5.00 1.26 1.45 0.92 2.44
γ2 G 0.30 3.00 0.63 0.71 0.69 1.01
γ3 G 0.30 3.00 0.34 0.31 0.69 1.01
voltp,12 B 0.95 0.99 - 0.42 0.43 0.96
voltp,21 B 0.95 0.99 - 0.94 0.43 0.96
σr(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.36 0.04 0.13 1.54
σr(vol, 2) W 0.23 1.00 - 0.05 0.13 1.54
σd(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.76 0.95 0.13 1.54
σd(vol, 2) W 0.27 1.00 - 1.03 0.13 1.54
σs(vol, 1) W 0.37 1.00 2.77 1.29 0.13 1.54
σs(vol, 2) W 0.87 1.00 - 1.96 0.13 1.54
σz(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.35 1.81 0.13 1.54
σz(vol, 2) W 0.23 1.00 - 0.87 0.13 1.54
σq(vol, 1) W 0.37 1.00 0.33 0.68 0.13 1.54
σq(vol, 2) W 0.87 1.00 - 0.67 0.13 1.54
σe(vol, 1) W 0.37 1.00 0.54 1.36 0.13 1.54
σe(vol, 2) W 0.87 1.00 - 1.62 0.13 1.54
σfi(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.78 1.21 0.13 1.54
σfi(vol, 2) W 0.23 1.00 - 1.43 0.13 1.54
σfy(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.57 0.68 0.13 1.54
σfy(vol, 2) W 0.23 1.00 - 0.18 0.13 1.54
σfr(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.17 0.20 0.13 1.54
σfr(vol, 2) W 0.23 1.00 - 0.18 0.13 1.54
Note: B=beta distribution, G=Gamma distribution and W=Weibull
distributin. See Gelman et al. (2014) pp.11 for exposition on why some
of the posterior densities may be outside the Bayesian credible intervals.
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of the structural and shock process parameters decline marginally in magnitude,
with the exception of export shock, foreign inflation, foreign interest rate and pref-
erence shock processes. This may show how critical these variables have become
in the design of monetary policy.
With respect to the estimated posterior mode of inverse elasticity of labour
supply (ψ) is 1.18 compared to 1.65 in the constant model in Table 4.2. This
implies that workers have to use about 0.85 more hours of their time to work
when volatility increase in the economy is compared to 0.61 in the constant model.
Thus, an increase in volatility of the structural innovations have negative effects
on the welfare of workers in this context.
The posterior mode of the price elasticity of exports demand (δe) value of
0.012 suggests that at present South Africa’s gold export demand is price inelastic.
However, when volatility in the structural innovations are accounted for, the value
increases from 0.003 to 0.012, respresenting about a 300 per cent increase. This
suggests that changes in world prices of primary commodity exports contribute to
major shifts in macroeconomic outcomes in emerging economies that depend on
primary commodity exports. Clearly, the movements in the commodity exports
price presents a challenge to the economy because of its larger effect on fiscal
policy and the balance of payments.
Similarly, the commodity export shock process ρe of 0.99 is quite high. Since
the shock process parameter is a long-lived one, it is most likely that the cost of
policy stabilisation may exceed gains from policy smoothing ρr of 0.98. In the
light of this, there is likely to be a little scope for successful implementation of
policy stabilisation. In regime 2 export shock variance (σe(vol, 2)) is 1.62, this is
much higher relative to regime 1 export shock variance of 1.36, as shown in Table
4.3. This evidence suggests that the primary commodity export sector may have
an important role to play in the design of monetary policy in emerging economies.
This study reveals that one of the main drivers of shocks variances hitting the
economy is the primary commoditiy export shock. What is more, is that it can be
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deduced that the constant DSGE model may pick up some of the shock variances
emanating from primary commodity export shocks leading to bias conclusions.
Regarding the policy parameters of inflation, output, and exchange rate de-
preciation, the values are slightly higher compared to the constant DSGE model
estimates, except the exchange rate. The weights are 1.45, 0.71 and 0.31 for in-
flation (γ1), output (γ2) and exchange rate (γ3), respectively. It is proposed here
that when volatility increases in the structural innovations, policy authority pays
more attention to inflation and output relative to the exchange rate. This is to
ensure that policy authority does not deviate from its policy objectives of stable
inflation and output growth.
The estimated posterior mode of the interest rate smoothing (ρr) is 0.98,
slightly higher than what has been observed in the South African economy. This
suggests that when the economy experiences high volatility in structural shocks,
policy authorities either engage in smoothing the interest rate to keep the financial
markets sound instead of either explicitly targeting the exchange rate or interven-
ing in the activity of the foreign exchange market. It is thus suggested that when
volatility increases, policy authorities are willing to combine price stability with
financial stability (see also Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003a) for the
reasons why a central bank may smoothing the interest rates). However, the vari-
ances of the policy shock σr(vol, 1) reduced from 0.36 in the constant DSGE to
0.04 in regime 1 and 0.05 in regime 2. This implies that an increase in volatility
makes monetary policy less effective. The conclusion here is that the effects of
policy shocks is clearly weaker when the economy experiences a rise in volatility of
the structural shocks. The evidence given as shown above, there is little support
for this view in the literature discussed earlier that monetary policy is important
in influencing the level of aggregate variables in the economy.
Finally, the estimated posterior mode variances for the transition probabilities
of regime 2 is quite high. In regime 2 (voltp,2), that is, the high volatility state
has estimated posterior mode of 0.95 is substantially larger compared to regime
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1 (voltp,1) variance of 0.42. This shows that the responses of policy authorities
to inflation and output are high in regime 2 compared to regime 1, which also
suggests that policy authority prefers to remain longer in the inflation targeting
regime compared to the monetary aggregates regime.
4.5.3 Smoothed Transition Probabilities
The top panel of Figure 4.2 in Appendix B 4.7.2 shows the smoothed transition
probabilities for high volatility state in regime 2. Thus two major high volatility
states in the South African economy are identified for the periods 1981 to 1985
and 2008 to 2010. From 1981 to 1985, the South African economy experienced the
longest period ever of high macroeconomic volatility. The high volatility regime
coincided with gold price shock, poor sovereign risk rating, trade and financial
sanctions that adversely affected the economy over the period 1981 and 1985.
Similarly, the high volatility regime is consistent with the SARB estimates of
downswing business cycle phases that lasted about 40 months between 1981 and
1986. The second major shift was in 2008, when the global economy experienced
the financial crisis. This suggests that the South African economy is financially
integrated into the global economy, therefore, major global events are likely to
affect the domestic economy.
A critical observation of the top panel of Figure 4.2 shows that there are many
short periods of high macroeconomic volatility. These short period volatilities
coincided with domestic events in the economy, such as large capital outflows
towards the run up to the 1994 election and over the period 2001 to 2002, when
the economy witnessed an exchange rate depreciation of over 30 per cent.
The bottom panel of Figure 4.2 shows the low monetary policy response state
in regime 2 on a macroeconomic condition index. Thus policy switched from a
high monetary policy regime to a low monetary policy regime from 1985 until
2003. This suggests that the actual conduct of monetary aggregates regime ended
in 2003, according to the plot in the bottom panel of Figure 4.2. Besides, this
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implies that the effect of monetary policy responses to macroeconomic condition
index is low, beginning 2003. Following this, the policy authority switched from
responding more towards a marcoeconomic condition index, such as the exchange
rate in 2003, to responding more to inflation and output stability after the adoption
of an inflation targetiing regime.
4.5.4 Robustness Check
The aim of this subsection is to evaluate the robustness of the baseline model used
here in relation to two alternative specifications as reported in Figure 4.4, for the
baseline model might not be parsimonious as described by the data. First, gold
exports are replaced with merchandise exports, in that they capture heterogenous
clusters of primary commodity exports. Secondly, the baseline model is restricted
similar to Justiniano and Preston (2010), in case the primary commodity export
shock biases these baseline results.
Table 4.4: Robustness check: Statistics for model comparison
BIC AICc Log-MDD Log-posterior Log-like Log-prior
MEX 6416.20 6326.37 -3398.25 -3098.98 -3023.97 -75.01
REM 3826.86 3740.65 -2010.87 -1814.23 -1721.64 -92.59
Vol 3694.32 3584.26 -1926.40 -1738.04 -1679.07 -58.97
Note: MEX=merchandise exports and assume the structural shocks are
regime switching. REM=restricted model, that is, the original model of
Justiniano and Preston (2010) and assume the structural shocks are regime
switching, Vol=volatility only in the structural shocks are regime switching.
The two alternative specifications reveal that the model with volatility in struc-
tural shocks only fit the data better. The models’ selection criterion is compared
with the baseline model, as reported in Table 4.4. The three criteria, namely
AICc, BIC and log-MDD, show that the chosen baseline model outperforms the
other two specifications. Most of the parameter estimates of the two alternative
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specifications are displayed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 in Appendix B 4.7.2. These
are very similar to these baseline estimates with few variations in the estimates
although there are huge differences in the the transition probabilities and shock
variances.
4.5.5 Evolution of Macroeconomic Outcomes in the South
African Economy
The generalised dynamic responses, variance and historical decompositions of the
volatility in structural shocks DSGE model are used in this section to evaluate the
performance of the South African economy. It is only observed domestic variables
relevant to this study that are examined to keep the discussion brief.
4.5.5.1 Generalised Dynamic Responses
To characterise the macroeconomic outcomes of the South African economy, the
generalised dynamic responses are investigated in this section. A one standard
deviation of a policy shock, as reported in the first block of Figure 4.3, generates
about 0.2 per cent decline in real consumption and this leads to about 0.1 per
cent decline in output growth. As output growth declines, it slows down increases
in consumer price inflation by about 1.5 per cent and gradually decay within 3
quarters. This transmission is consistent with inflation targeting principles in that
once policy authority adjusts the policy rate, investments decline and this leads
to a decline in output growth and slows inflationary pressures. It is also found
that a policy shock transmits about 2 per cent to exchange rate appreciation and
this results in about 0.4 per cent fall in import cost inflation.
Regarding export shock reported in the last block of Figure 4.3, a one stan-
dard deviation of export shock results in about 0.007 per cent reduction in policy
rate. This transmits approximately a 1.8 per cent increase in gold export, which
translates to about a 0.03 per cent output growth. This means that a reduction
in policy rate serves as an incentive for a lower cost of gold extraction and raises
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gold revenues, which in turn boost output growth.
A positive risk premium shock, as shown in the first block of Figure 4.4, is
followed by more than a 5 per cent to exchange rate depreciation. This translates
into an about 1 per cent increase in import-cost inflation. The effect on import-cost
inflation gradually decays within 12 quarters, which generates an about 0.2 per
cent slowdown in consumer price inflation. This improves on the terms of trade
by about 2.5 per cent and also provides a marginal increase in output growth.
With respect to import-cost inflation as shown in the last block of Figure 4.4,
a one standard deviation leads to an about 0.1 per cent increase in policy rate.
This further generates an about 2 per cent decline in real household consumption
and leads to an about 0.2 per cent reduction in output growth. This follows a
consumer price inflation increase of about 4 per cent.
It is found that a one standard deviation to a preference shock in the first block
of Figure 4.5 generates an about 2 per cent increase in real household consumption,
which stabilises within 12 quarters. This increases output growth by about 1 per
cent and leads to a 2 per cent increase in consumer price inflation. The preference
shock also leads to exchange rate appreciation by about 2 per cent, which generates
a decline in gold exports by about 0.15 per cent. A technology shock in the last
block of Figure 4.5 transmits a positive response to gold exports. It has, however, a
depreciating effect on consumer price inflation. The responses to real consumption
and nominal effective exchange rate depreciation are lower.
It is worth mentioning that import-cost inflation, risk premia and export shocks
have a larger impact on macroeconomic movements compared to monetary policy
shock.
4.5.5.2 Counterfactual Dynamic Responses
Because this work is interested in the responses of each regime, regime 1 and
regime 2 are compared with respect to policy, exports, import-cost inflation and
risk premia shocks to isolate the effects of the dynamics of each regime.
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In the first and last blocks of Figure 4.6, policy responses in regime 1 and regime
2 are compared. The policy responses in regime 2 is much larger relative to the
responses in regime 1 by about 0.3 per cent for inflation and output. This implies
that in regime 2 policy authority is much more concerned with inflation and output
stability relative to regime 1, and this is also supported by the estimates in Table
4.3. Similarly, the first and last blocks of Figure 4.7 show the responses to export
shock regimes. In regime 2, export shocks have relatively larger effect on inflation
and output, exchange rate and gold exports compared to policy rate, while in
regime 1 export shocks have larger effects on policy rate. This suggests that
in regime 2—an inflation targeting regime—minimal shocks from export shocks
may have helped the conduct of monetary policy relative to regime 1, which is a
monetary aggregates regime.
Figure 4.8 shows the import-cost inflation regimes. Regime 1 shows higher
pass-through effects of import cost inflation relative to regime 2. This suggests
that the exchange rate pass-through to import prices then to consumer price in-
flation has been well managed in an inflation targeting regime as compared to a
monetary targeting regime. Important evidence is given in the risk premia regimes
as reported in Figure 4.9. This shows that the effect of risk premia shocks and
its volatility remain relatively the same in inflation targeting and monetary aggre-
gates regimes. This suggests that the two regimes are less effective in helping to
reduce risk premia shocks in the economy.
4.5.5.3 Variance Decompositions
To understand the relative importance of each variable to another at each forecast
horizon and thus the extent of their interaction over a particular forecast hori-
zon, the variance decompositions are evaluated and the estimates in Figure 4.10
through to Figure 4.12 are reported upon.
In the left panel of Figure 4.10, the variance decomposition of the policy rate
shows that technology and import-cost shocks are the main contributors to policy
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rate volatility. In the long run, the size of import-cost inflation is larger relative to
a technology shock. One striking finding is that monetary policy shock variances
have barely no impact on policy rate, as reported in the left panel of Figure 4.10.
The variance decomposition of consumer price inflation in the right panel of Figure
4.10 reveals that technology and import cost inflation shocks drive consumer price
inflation volatility, but policy shock remains small in consumer price inflation
volatility. This result is consistent with the real business cycle thesis in which
technology shock is the main driver of volatility in an economy. This suggests
that in an inflation targeting regime, policy authority should pay attention to
technology and import-cost inflation because of their larger effects on the inflation
and policy rate.
Regarding the variance decomposition of output gap in the left panel of Fig-
ure 4.11, preference shock is the main driver of output gap volatility. Although
import-cost inflation, risk premia and technology shocks have a slight effect on
output gap volatility, monetary policy shock variances do not affect output gap.
A similar pattern is exhibited in the real consumption in the right panel of Figure
4.11. However, import-cost inflation contributes relatively larger volatility to real
consumption in the long run compare to output gap growth.
Gold exports in the left panel of Figure 4.12, show that monetary policy, risk
premia and foreign shocks do not have significant impact on gold exports volatil-
ity. Instead, export, import-cost inflation and technology shocks are the main
contributors to gold exports variability. With regards to exchange rate variable in
the right panel of Figure 4.12, the main contributor to exchange rate variability
is the risk premia shock. Moreover, changes in policy shock has smaller effect on
exchange rate depreciation relative to risk premia shock. This implies that on av-
erage, the short-term interest rate in South Africa is relatively higher as compared
to foreign investor country and thus generates excess returns for investors.
In conclusion, the results of the variance decompositions suggest that the major
drivers of macroeconomic volatility in the South African economy are import-
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cost inflation, technology changes, commodity exports and preference changes.
These findings seem to be consistent with South Africa, an emerging economy
with a volatile currency that experiences volatile portfolio flows and went through
financial market liberalisation, and is thus susceptible to adverse exchange rate
shocks. Moreover, the majority of its exports are primary commodities and a
large component of its imports are usually manufactured goods. Further, the
South African currency was one of the most important currencies of emerging
economies over the period 1998 to 2013 and usually has a trade ranking between
the top 10 and top 20 in the currencies distribution of global foreign exchange
market turnover.14
4.5.5.4 Historical Decompositions
The historical decompositions are analysed to help identify the role played by the
shocks in the movements of domestic observed variables.
The left panel of Figure 4.13 shows a different contribution of shocks to move-
ments in policy rate. From 1982 to 1990, import cost inflation and export shocks
subtracted from the policy rate. This meant that the economy was saddled with
structural bottlenecks, such as a high desire for imported goods and weak export
promotion relative to demand management policies. In 2000 and 2003, however, it
became modest, for this trend was reversed during the global financial crisis until
2016, contributing positively to policy rate movements. In the mid 1990s to 2016,
export and preference shocks made a positive contribution to upward movements
in policy rate. Risk premia and technology shocks accounted for a positive con-
tribution to policy rate movements in the 1980s until 1994. But this trend was
14See Bank for International Settlement preliminary global results on the Triennal Central
Bank Survey Foreign exchange turnover in April 2014. South Africa also has the most developed
financial markets in sub-Saharan African and a higher financial development index that is of
higher ranking relative to even some developed and emerging economies such as Italy, Poland,
Brazil, Chile and Russia, among others. This can be found in the World Economic Forum
Financial Development Ranking Report 2012.
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reversed from the beginning of 1999 to 2016, as risk premia and technology shock
made a negative contribution to the policy rate. This suggests that an increase in
technology and capital inflows lead to output growth.
Regarding consumer price inflation reported in the right panel of Figure 4.13,
the main driver of movements in consumer price inflation is import-cost inflation
shock. In the mid 1980s, import-cost inflation shock showed a negative effect
on consumer price inflation. However, from 1986 to 2008, it showed persistent
upswings and downswings in the movements of consumer price inflation. After
the global financial crisis of 2008, the swings continued but with less pass-through
to consumer price inflation. This may suggest that lower import cost inflation
to consumer price inflation can in part be attributed to trade integration of the
South African economy. However, policy shock has a neglible effect on consumer
price inflation.
Prior to 1999, import cost inflation and risk premia shocks positively con-
tributed to output growth movements but remained modest between 1999 to 2005,
as reported in the left panel of Figure 4.14. Afterwards this trend is reversed,
where import cost inflation and risk premia shock contribute negative to output
growth. Similarly, preference shocks contributed negative to output growth be-
ginning in 1991 until 1997. From 2008 to 2016, technology and preference shocks
contributed positive to output growth, whereas risk premia and import cost infla-
tion substracted from output. These findings suggest that downward movements
in import-cost inflation and risk premia and upward movements in technology and
preference changes can stimulate the economy, even to holding policy rate con-
stant. A similar trend is observed in the real household consumption, as reported
in the right panel of Figure 4.14. However, import-cost inflation has a larger effect
on real household consumption.
With respect to gold exports shown in the left panel of Figure 4.15, import-cost
inflation and technology shocks contributed negatively to gold exports movements
from 1981 to 2008. Beginning in 2008, import-cost and technology shocks had
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a positive effect on gold exports movements. Likewise, risk premia, exports and
preference shocks contribute positively to gold export growth from 1998 to 2010,
while from 2003 risk premia and export shocks made a negative contribution to
gold exports movements. The right panel of Figure 4.15 reports the movements
in exchange rate depreciation. This shows that from 2008 until 2016, import-cost
inflation, export, and risk premia subtracted from exchange rate depreciation,
whereas technology shock positively impacted on real exchange rate.
To sum up, it is found that import cost inflation, risk premia, technology,
preference, and export shocks are the main drivers in the movements of macroe-
conomic variables in the South African economy. Therefore, it is proposed that
the policy authority should endeavour to identify the sources that contribute to
macroeconomic fluctuations. Once the sources are identified, then policy authority
is advised to understand the effects of the underlying factors more broadly instead
of paying attention to changes in the monetary policy rule only.
4.6 Conclusion
In macroeconomic modeling, the importance of establishing the sources that ac-
count for economic fluctuations has always been underscored. In this chapter,
therefore, empirical evidence of some of the likely sources of macroeconomic volatil-
ity is provided. The primary commodity export sector shock is thus allowed to
follow a regime switching process and carry out Bayesian inference in a Markov-
switching dynamic stochastic general equilibriun model. The present findings
suggest that constant dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model results are
very similar to the evidence in the literature with slight variations. Whereas in
the volatility in structural innovations only model, some of the estimated posterior
modes of the structural and shock processes fall marginally, exports, import-cost
inflation, technology and preference shock persistence are high. This indicates
that these shock processes have relatively long-lived effects on macroeconomic
outcomes in emerging economies.
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In addition, the estimated policy parameters reveal that policy authority re-
sponses to inflation is significant relative to output and exchange rate deprecia-
tion. Two major high macroeconomic volatilities are identified in the transition
probabilities that coincide with the movements in the observed variables and the
business cycle phases in the South African economy. Another finding shows that
a monetary policy shock decreases the output gap, but has a negligible effect on
consumer price inflation. In historical and variance decompositions, import-cost
inflation shock, preference shock, technology shock, risk premia and export shocks
are the main drivers of economic performance in the domestic economy. In short,
the model with the primary commodity export sector coupled with volatility in
structural shocks better explain macroeconomic dynamics in an emerging economy
as compared to alternative experiements.
Of course this study is not conclusive, the transition probabilities of the switch-
ing parameters are time-invariant, that is, subject to critique. This, therefore,
requires that the switching parameters are endogenised. However, due to the com-
putational complexity of the Markov-switching dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium, a reduced-form Markov-switching vector autogression model is employed
in the next chapter to shed light on how the transition probabilities parameters
vary over time, although in a different context. Moreover, future research along
these lines is needed to understand how these models work and interact to shape
monetary policy conduct in the South African economy and similar emerging
economies.
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4.7 Appendix B: Chapter 4
4.7.1 Model Equations
Table 4.5: Rest of model equations fitted to data
Description Equation
Terms of trade st = st−1 − πht + π
f
t
Exchange rate depreciation ∆et = qt − qt−1 + πt − πfit
CPI inflation πt = (1− α)πht + απ
f
t
Net foreign assets nfat =
1
β
nfat−1 − α(qt + αst) + yt − ct
Shock processes
Export shock zet = ρezet−1 + σ
ee
Preference shock zdt = ρdzdt−1 + σ
ed
Import cost shock zst = ρezst−1 + σ
es
Technology shock zpt = ρzzpt−1 + σ
ep
Risk premia shock zqt = ρqzqt−1 + σ
eq













Table 4.6: Parameters and variables description
Parameter Description Variable Description
δe Price elasticity of export demand xet Export demand
α Share of foreign goods in consumption yfyt Foreign output gap
ω Elasticity of sub betw. home and foreign goods pw Relative price of exports
δh Price index for home-produced goods πt CPI inflation
δf Price index for foreign-produced goods st Terms of trade
β Subjective discount factor ct Final household consumption
φh Price adjustment cost for home-produced good rt Policy rate
φf Price adjustment cost for foreign-produced good yt Output gap
ψ Inverse elasticity of labour supply qt Real exhange rate
κ Debt elast. w.r.t. interest rate risk premia et Nominal exchange rate
τ elasticity of intertemporal substitution πf Import cost inflation
γ1 Weight on inflation param. π
h Domestic inflation
γ2 Weight on output param. π
fi Foreign inflation
γ3 Weight on changes in exchange rate nfat Net foreign assets
ρr Policy rate smoothing param. zet Export demand shock process
ρe Persistence param. for export shock zdt Preference shock process
ρd Persistence param. for preference shock zpt Technology shock process
ρs Persistence param. for imported inflation shock zst Import-cost shock process
ρz Persistence param. for technology shock
ρq Persistence param. for risk premia shock zqt Risk premia shock process
ρfi Persistence param. for foreign inflation shock σ
er Policy shock
ρfy Persistence param. for foreign output shock σ
ed Preference shock
ρfr Persistence param. for foreign interest rate shock σ
ep technology shock
σee Standard deviation of export shock σes Import cost shock
σed Standard deviation of preference shock σeq Risk premium shock
σes Standard deviation of import-cost shock σee export demand shock
σep Standard deviation of technology shock σefi foreign inflation shock
σeq Standard deviation of risk premia shock σefy foreign output shock
σefi Standard deviation of foreign inflation shock σefr foreign interest rate shock
σefy Standard deviation of foreign output shock λ Habit formation
σefr Standard deviation of foreign interest rate rfrt Foreign interest rate
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4.7.2 Estimation Results
Table 4.7: Robustness check: Posterior mode of structural and shock processes
Prior Posterior Mode
Par. Distr. 5% 95% VolPolSame VolPolInd Polonly MEX REM 5% 95%
λ G 0.54 1.50 0.31 0.49 0.04 0.32 0.62 0.06 4.59
τ G 0.54 1.50 0.11 0.49 1.05 0.67 1.93 0.06 4.59
α G 0.54 1.50 0.12 0.41 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.06 4.59
ω G 0.54 1.50 1.04 0.51 1.86 0.97 1.64 0.06 4.59
β B 0.10 2.00 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.22 0.18 3.94
φh G 0.58 1.00 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.25 1.58
φf G 0.58 1.00 0.84 0.48 0.83 0.61 0.98 0.25 1.58
δh G 0.54 1.50 0.19 0.36 0.11 0.29 0.22 0.06 4.59
δf G 0.54 1.50 0.24 0.39 0.003 0.01 0.02 0.06 4.59
δe G 0.54 1.50 0.05 0.12 0.004 005 - 0.06 4.59
ψ G 0.54 1.50 0.22 0.36 0.49 1.12 1.19 0.06 4.59
κ G 0.05 1.50 0.11 0.43 0.002 0.13 0.001 0.001 1.58
ρd B 0.05 0.90 0.81 0.78 0.89 0.84 0.88 0.28 8.97
ρs B 0.05 0.90 0.71 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.47 0.28 8.97
ρz B 0.05 0.90 0.73 0.74 0.87 0.93 0.90 0.28 8.97
ρq B 0.05 0.90 0.99 0.89 0.91 0.97 0.93 0.28 8.97
ρe B 0.05 0.90 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.34 - 0.28 8.97
ρfi B 0.05 0.90 0.46 0.58 0.25 0.58 0.61 0.28 8.97
ρfy B 0.05 0.90 0.47 0.59 0.89 0.99 0.62 0.28 8.97
ρfr B 0.05 0.90 0.42 0.51 0.27 0.43 0.98 0.28 8.97
B=Beta distribution, G=Gamma distribution, See Gelman et al. (2014) pp.11 for expo-
sition on why some of the posterior densities are outside the Bayesian credible inter-
vals. VolPolSame=structural shocks and policy parameters are simultanteous regime switching.
VolPolInd=structural shocks and policy parameters switch independent. PolOnly=policy param-
eters and shocks only are regime switching, MEX=merchandise exports with regime switching.
REM=restricted model that is the original model of Justiniano and Preston (2010).
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Table 4.8: Robustness check: Posterior mode of policy parameters and structural innovations
Prior Posterior Mode
Par. Distr. 5% 95% VolPolSame VolPolInd PolOnly MEX REM 5% 95%
ρr B 0.6 0.90 0.40 0.52 0.99 0.68 0.94 3.47 8.97
γ1(vol, 1) G 2.19 5.00 1.64 1.92 2.16 3.15 5.94 0.92 2.44
γ1(vol, 2) G 0.77 5.00 0.39 0.34 2.05 - - 0.92 2.44
γ2(vol, 1) G 0.30 3.00 0.14 0.27 0.16 0.31 0.70 0.69 1.01
γ2(vol, 2) G 0.17 3.00 0.25 0.15 0.00 - - 0.69 1.01
γ3(vol, 1) G 0.30 3.00 0.20 0.26 0.26 0.002 0.00 0.69 1.01
γ3(vol, 2) G 0.17 3.00 0.25 0.15 0.00 - - 0.69 1.01
voltp,12 B 0.95 0.99 0.71 0.949 - 0.95 0.15 0.43 0.96
voltp,21 B 0.95 0.99 0.75 0.949 - 0.20 0.04 0.43 0.96
coefltp,12 B 0.95 0.99 - 0.948 0.00 - - 0.43 0.96
coefltp,21 B 0.95 0.99 - 0.949 0.00 - 0.43 0.96
σr(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.77 0.37 0.13 1.54
σr(vol, 2) W 0.23 1.00 0.21 0.23 - 0.77 1.05 0.13 1.54
σd(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.14 0.17 0.70 0.30 0.001 0.13 1.54
σd(vol, 2) W 0.27 1.00 0.33 0.27 - 0.93 1.16 0.13 1.54
σs(vol, 1) W 0.37 1.00 0.21 0.31 2.71 0.001 6.32 0.13 1.54
σs(vol, 2) W 0.87 1.00 0.97 0.74 - 8.57 9.36 0.13 1.54
σz(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.14 0.18 1.52 1.81 0.14 0.13 1.54
σz(vol, 2) W 0.23 1.00 0.35 0.30 - 0.37 0.48 0.13 1.54
σq(vol, 1) W 0.37 1.00 0.22 0.32 1.18 0.003 0.003 0.13 1.54
σq(vol, 2) W 0.87 1.00 0.66 0.85 - 3.94 1.04 0.13 1.54
σe(vol, 1) W 0.37 1.00 0.22 0.28 1.90 0.006 - 0.13 1.54
σe(vol, 2) W 0.87 1.00 0.65 1.20 - 5.47 - 0.13 1.54
σfi(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.14 0.16 1.78 0.42 37.38 0.13 1.54
σfi(vol, 2) W 0.23 1.00 0.25 0.20 - 1.13 0.66 0.13 1.54
σfy(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.13 0.15 0.72 0.09 0.38 0.13 1.54
σfy(vol, 2) W 0.23 1.00 0.16 0.20 - 0.46 0.70 0.13 1.54
σfr(vol, 1) W 0.18 1.00 0.13 0.15 0.18 1.04 0.07 0.13 1.54
σfr(vol, 2) W 0.23 1.00 0.16 0.21 - 0.18 0.14 0.13 1.54
MEX=merchandise exports with regime switches; REM= the original model of Justiniano and Preston
(2010); VolPolSame=structural shocks and policy parameters switches; VolPolInd=structural shocks
and policy parameters switch independent. PolOnly=policy parameters switches only.
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High volatility regime(chain vol state 2)
smoothed probabilities for volatilityOnly model









#10 -11 low monetary policy response regime(chain coef state 2)
smoothed probabilities for policyOnly model
Figure 4.2: Smoothed transition probabilities
Note: Top panel is high volatility in regime 2 and bottom panel is low monetary policy
response in regime 2
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Figure 4.3: Dynamic responses to policy and export shocks
Note: First block is a policy shock and last block is an export shock
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Figure 4.4: Dynamic responses to risk premia and import-cost inflation shocks
Note: First block is a risk premia shock and last block is an import cost inflation shock
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Figure 4.5: Dynamic responses to preference and technology shock
Note: First block is a preference shock and last block is a technology shock
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Figure 4.6: Dynamic responses to monetary policy regimes
Note: First block is regime 1 and last block is regime 2
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Figure 4.7: Dynamic responses to export shock regimes
Note: First block is regime 1 and last block is regime 2
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Figure 4.8: Dynamic responses of import-cost inflation regimes
Note: First block is regime 1 and last block is regime 2
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Figure 4.9: Dynamic responses of risk premia regimes
Note: First block is regime 1 and last block is regime 2
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Figure 4.10: Variance deompositions of policy rate and CPI inflation
Note: Left panel is monetary policy rate and right panel is consumer price inflation
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Real consumption PCE(policy Only)
Figure 4.11: Variance decompositions of output gap and real consumption
Note: Left panel is output gap and right panel is real consumption
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Net gold exports(policy Only)


































Exchange rate depreciation(policy Only)
Figure 4.12: Variance decompositions of net gold exports and exchange rate deprecia-
tion




































































































































































Figure 4.13: Historical decompositions of policy rate and consumer price inflation




































































































































































Figure 4.14: Historical decompositions of output gap and real consumption

































































































































































Figure 4.15: Historical decompositions of net gold exports and exchange rate depreci-
ation




Following a Regime Change
5.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, policy authorities and academic economists have ad-
vocated for an independent central bank with clear policy objectives to ensure
their credibility. This is one of the underlining principles that motivates many
developed and emerging economies with unstable inflation to adopt an inflation
targeting regime. Whether central banks are credible and how credibility affects
economic performance after adoption of inflation targeting regime is still an open
debate. This chapter, therefore, tests whether the adoption of an inflation target-
ing regime improves policy authority credibility along with its associated effects
on macroeconomic dynamics, using an example of an emerging economy, that of
South Africa. For the purposes of this chapter, central bank credibility refers to
the conduct in which a policy authority adopts a monetary policy framework and
sticks to it, meaning that the policy authority says what it does and does what
it says. Put differently, a policy authority is credible if economic agents believe it
will do what it says (see Blinder (1999)).
Given this, there are three important reasons motivating a current investiga-
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tion into this question. First, there is a debate as to whether credibility improves
when a new policy framework is in place and how it generates positive macroe-
conomic outcomes. For example, Walsh (2011) and Taylor (2014) argue that the
conduct of policy authorities is important in influencing economic agents’ infla-
tion expectations relative to institutional structures. Alternatively, Sargent (2012)
and Cukierman (2013) contend that the gap between realised and target inflation
stems from the degree of institutional evolution that then affects monetary policy
credibility.
Secondly, regarding the South Africa situation, the inflation target calender
year average was revised in 2002 to a medium-term target from November 2003.
Moreover, the South African Reserve Bank switched its inflation target from the
consumer price index excluding mortgage interest cost (CPIX) in 2008 to the
overall consumer price index (CPI) in 2009. The reason is that rising interest
rates increase mortgage costs and, in turn, increase inflation, which would lead to
higher policy rates. However, if economic agents act on the basis of CPIX inflation
while the SARB targets the CPI inflation, then CPI inflation is not a credible
measure of inflation among economic agents. Lastly, following the adoption of an
inflation targeting regime in South Africa from 2000 to 2008, the SARB on average
is credible among economic agents based on a credibility indicator as shown in this
chapter.1 Between 2003 and 2007, the observed CPIX inflation remained within
the inflation target band of 3 and 6 per cent. This trajectory had changed in
early 2008. In most of the months in 2008 and 2009, CPI inflation exceeded the
upper limit of the inflation target. Similarly, from 2011 to 2016 inflation was on an
upward trajectory. This trend leads one to question the credibility of the SARB.
This issue is addressed in this chapter to determine how the dynamics of cred-
ibility evolves over time and, further, to reconcile some of the disparities in the
literature. To effect this, a Markov-switching Bayesian vector autoregressive model
with time-varying transition probabilities is used. This advances a unique way of
1See first top left panel of Figure 5.1 and top panel of Figure 5.3 for the statistics.
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investigating the evolution of central bank credibility. This will determine which
of the macroeconomic indicators have larger effects on the dynamics of policy
credibility and the importance of these indicators.
The theoretical method used in this study follows Taylor (1993), Cecchetti
and Krause (2002), Kozicki and Tinsley (2007) and De Mendonça and Souza
(2009). Thus, the main contribution of this chapter to the literature is to incor-
porate Markov-switches with transition probabilities into the modeling framework
in examining central bank credibility. These are able to capture the underlying
unobserved dynamic of policy credibility. Previous studies that estimate central
bank credibility are based on educated guesses and assume that the underlying
parameters are time-invariant (see Montes (2009), Bordo and Siklos (2014) and
Levieuge et al. (2015)). The underlying unobserved properties of policy authority
credibility is estimated. This makes the approach more appealing and allows the
data instead of the researcher to parameterise the model. Some authors recom-
mend thinking of the measure of credibility as evolving over time and nonlinear
(see Bordo and Siklos (2017) and Levieuge et al. (2015)). In this light, the evidence
regarding the time path of credibility is provided, taking into account changes in
macroeconomic conditions.
This thesis’s findings suggest that most of the high variances in credibility
occurred around 1990 and 2000, then are followed by the crisis in 2008 when the
policy authority moved to a low credibility regime state. The dynamic responses
show that a positive credibility shock generates a reduction in policy rate that leads
to a decline in the inflation rate. Although real GDP does not react immediately,
uncertainty in it increases, implying that economic agents are suspicious of sudden
gains in policy authority credibility. This further suggests that a credible policy
authority does not require frequent changes in the policy rate because it takes time
to build credibility, which has a significant effect on monetary policy to stabilise
inflation and output.
Another important finding is that inflation accounts for a larger amount of
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variability in credibility compared to variability in credibility due to the policy
rate. This presupposes that private agents observe inflation changes and use this
information to evaluate the degree of policy authority credibility in the South
African economy. This result is related to the finding of Montes (2013), who finds
that credibility impacts on the inflation expectations of private agents, which in
turn affect investment and employment decisions.
The rest of the chapter is organised into six sections. Section 2 reviews related
literature and section 3 discusses the theoretical approach underpinning the mea-
sure of central bank credibility. Section 4 outlines the econometric framework,
data and stylised facts. Section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6
concludes the chapter.
5.2 Related Literature
Many authors have proposed varying descriptions of policy credibility. One of the
most widely used descriptions is related to Kydland and Prescott (1977), Cukier-
man (1986), Ball (1994) and Blinder (1999). According to Cukierman (1986),
policy credibility is a state in which economic agents accept policy authority ob-
jectives that are consistent with current economic conditions. Without this, eco-
nomic agents will suspect any policy announcement that is not in line with policy
objectives. Ball (1994) postulates that policy credibility is the reason for low
inflation which leads to economic expansion. He argues that it is not the stag-
gered price setting that is the main setback to disinflation, rather it is credibility.
Although, this chapter is related in the most part to these definitions, it differs
by allowing for a possible change in the level of policy credibility in a structural
analysis to account for the unobserved policy credibility.
Another strand of the literature measures policy credibility and investigates
how policy credibility affects macroeconomic stability. This study shares simi-
lar concepts of credibility in either the difference between inflation expectations
and the target inflation rate or observed inflation and the target inflation rate.
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Empirically, Bomfim and Rudebusch (2000) and Demertzis et al. (2008) quantify
credibility and experiement with it on the U.S. economy. The central message is
that commitment policy helps to reduce the length and cost of disinflation com-
pared to discretionary monetary policy because commitment leads to credibility
gains.
Similarly, Amisano and Tronzano (2010), Mariscal et al. (2011) and Kupfer
(2015) use the Svensson (1993) test of inflation targeting credibility to under-
stand financial markets’ inflation expectations. Amisano and Tronzano (2010)
and Kupfer (2015) use the test as an example on the European Central Bank
credibility. The authors find that the European Central Bank anchored financial
market inflation expectations. However, Kupfer (2015), identifies that inflation
targeting is credible during a tranquil period as compared to a crisis period such
as the recent financial crisis in 2008. Therefore, he proposes that during a crisis,
one needs to account for a risk premium and liquidity effects. In the context of
the Bank of England, Mariscal et al. (2011) use the same model and conclude
that prior to the adoption of the inflation targeting regime in 1992 to 2007, the
policy authority in the U.K. gained credibility but the Bank’s credibility worsened
thereafter.
This work differs from these authors in two ways. It explicitly allows the belief
structure of credibility to change over time and derives its credibility indicator
from the Taylor rule principle that measures credibility as a performance base.
Although Amisano and Tronzano (2010) and Mariscal et al. (2011) use Bayesian
inference, that is close to this thesis, the difference is that this complements the
literature using time-varying transition probabilities that are capable of capturing
the underlying unobserved dynamics of policy credibility. And thus progresses
and makes a contribution to the existing structural literature on central bank
credibility.
In this light, this chapter is related to Kozicki and Tinsley (2007), De Mendonça
and Souza (2009) and Bordo and Siklos (2015), who use a panel method, OLS and
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a generalised method of moments to examine changes in the credibility of central
banks. This thesis contributes to this literature when using a Markov-switching
Bayesian vector autoregression with time-varying transition probabilities, as rec-
ommended by Bordo and Siklos (2015). They propose that an intuitive way of
understanding the dynamics of policy authority credibility is to examine it in a
nonlinear way and a regime-switching approach.
There are other studies that examine policy authority credibility from the per-
spective of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. These include among
others, Debortoli and Nunes (2014), Goy et al. (2016) and Park (2016). They
examine the Federal Reserve Board credibility in a Markov-switching dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium framework in which the Board posseses commit-
ment technology. The results do not favour either full commitment or discretion.
Instead, the Board resets its policy objectives depending on the prevailing eco-
nomic environment. Park (2016) investigates a measure of credibility and shows
that credibility helps to stabilise macroeconomic fluctuations and influences the
responses of inflation to policy shocks and lowers disinflation cost. He concludes
that credibility gains reduce variability in inflation and output.
There are various studies that look at South African central bank credibil-
ity from different perspectives and using varying methodologies, such as micro
data and time series properties, Rigobón (2007), Reid (2009), Kaseeram (2012),
Kabundi et al. (2015) and Pierdzioch et al. (2016). The common finding is that the
SARB is credible among financial markets inflation expectations but firms, trade
unions and households show wide deviations from their inflation expectations and
the target inflation. However, not much is known about the effects of central bank
credibility on macroeconomic dynamics in South Africa. In this context, it is im-
portant to examine whether regime change contributes to central bank credibility
gains and its effect on monetary policy transmission to inflation and output.
In addition, these authors recommend further investigations into this type of
debate. In particular, Kaseeram (2012) and Kabundi et al. (2015) suggest that
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to adequately address a related question posed at the beginning of this chapter,
that is, whether central banks are credible and its effects on the transmission
of monetary policy to macroeconomic outcomes requires an alternative method.
This is where this chapter becomes very relevant and important in the South
African context, for it appears that no study has examined the evolving nature of
credibility in the conduct of monetary policy using this approach.
5.3 Theoretical Approach
The seminal contribution of Taylor (1993) description of monetary policy conduct
of the Federal Reserve Board evolves as
rt = rt + π + α1(πt − π) + α2(yt − yt) + µt, (5.1)
where rt is the nominal policy rate, rt is the long run policy rate, (πt−πt) is a four-
quarter moving average of observed GDP deflator less target inflation, (yt− yt) is
a weighted average of real GDP gap and µt is the policy rate shock.
By inspection of eq. (5.1) that has five variables and two parameters, a possible
policy failure emerges that explains the great inflation of the 1970s in three ways.
First, changes in the responses of the policy parameters as estimated by Clarida
et al. (2000). According to them, the responses of the policy rate was not consistent
with the responses of the inflation rate. This shows that economic agents inflation
expectations in the 1970s were not generated from macroeconomic fundamentals.
Secondly, the proper characterisation of the policy authority perception of the
natural rate of policy rate, inflation and output is problematic. Thus, a typical
example is the lack of proper estimates of the policy authority’s potential output.
Finally, central banks attempt to exploit a perceived trade-off between inflation
and output growth.2 However, the weakness of these explanations lie in the lack of
empirical estimates to recover the implied inflation target and the constraints on
2See, Nelson (2004) and Sargent (2012) for some of the discussion about the causes of the
great inflation in the 1970s.
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the scope of the policy rate responses to directly impact on output and inflation
rate.
As a result, Kozicki and Tinsley (2007) develop an implied and effective infla-
tion target rate on the assumption that in the absence of an inflation target and
clear policy objectives, the true policy authority inflation target is achieved only
in the outcome of the realised inflation rate. Secondly, policy decisions are based
on the knowledge available at the time in which decisions were made. Therefore,
the actual setting of the policy rate is a forward-looking specification of the form
r∗t,f = rt + πt + α1,t(πt+k|t − πt) + α2,t(yt+k|t − yt) + α3,t∆yt|t, (5.2)
where r∗t,f is the desired policy rate and πt+k|t is the expected inflation. yt+k|t
and ∆yt|t are the expected output and changes in forecast output. If the policy
authority places a larger weight on output, then the desired dynamic reaction of
the policy rate can be a function of the forecast changes in output growh of the
form
rt,f = β5,t∆rt,f−1 + (1− β6,t)r∗t,f + β6,trt,f−1 + ηt,f . (5.3)
Here, the policy rate adjustment is based on previous period policy rate changes,
partial adjustment of the policy rate to the desired policy setting and a disturbance
term ηt,f .
Combining eqs.(5.2) and (5.3) yields
rt,f = β1,t + β2,tπt+k|t + β3,t(yt+k|t − yt|t) + β4,t∆yt|t
+ β5,t∆rt,f−1 + β6,t(rt,f−1 − rt) + rt + ηt,f , (5.4)
where β1,t = (1− α1,t − β6,t + β6,tα1,t)πt, β2,t = (1− β6,t)α1,t, β3,t = (1− β6,t)α2,t
and β4,t = (1 − β6,t)α3,t. Then the parameters in eq. (5.4) are mapped to the
structural parameters and unobserved inflation target in eqs. (5.2) and (5.3) to
yield policy authority implied inflation target of the form
πt =
−β1,t
β2,t + β6,t − 1
(5.5)
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Further, Kozicki and Tinsley (2007) show that in economies where a monetary ag-
gregates target was in place before inflation targeting regime, an effective inflation
target can be derived as
πet = ∆mt −∆yt + ∆vt (5.6)
where πet is an effective inflation target, ∆mt is the target growth rate of money
supply, ∆yt is the natural rate of output and ∆vt is the trend velocity of money.
This implies that an effective inflation target is increased when there is a reduction
in the natural rate of output and increases in money growth and the velocity of
money. This is the strategy used to estimate the inflation target from 1986 to
1999, where the SARB practised monetary aggregates targeting.
Following this theoretical approach, the credibility indicator is obtained based
on a measure developed by Cecchetti and Krause (2002) and modified by De Men-
donça and Souza (2009), this takes the form
CIt =

1 if πt+1|t = πt
1− 1
π∗t − πt
[πt+1|t − πt] if π∗t,min < πt+1|t < π∗t,max
0 if πt,max ≤ πt+1|t ≤ πt,min
where CIt is the credibility indicator that has value 1 when expected inflation
(πt+1|t) or observed inflation equals inflation target πt and decreases linearly if the
expected inflation (πt+1|t) or observed inflation deviates from the inflation target
πt. Whereas π
∗
t is the inflation target range which has upper and lower limits.
The target range allows the central bank the degree of flexibility to absorb shocks
outside its control. The shocks include the first-round effects of supply shocks,
the appropriate time period to restore inflation within the target range and the
interest rate smoothing over the business cycle.
This implies that in the periods when a central bank credibility is strict, cred-
ibility remains within the range of 0 and 1 when expected inflation (πt+1|t) or
observed inflation remains within the maximum and minimum limit of inflation
π∗t , and 0 when it exceeds the limit of inflation π
∗
t established by the central bank’s
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internal arrangement. Although there are various credibility indicators that have
been proposed in the literature, the reasons for the adoption of the Cecchetti and
Krause (2002) measure are: in the policy credibility literature this measure is pop-
ular and has been used in many empirical works. Similarly, the measure is capable
of capturing changes in credibility consistent with an inflation targeting regime
and disciplines policy authorities when inflation deviations from the inflation tar-
get. Finally, the measure is simple to compute and has intuitive understanding of
changes in credibility.
Given the credibility indicator, the policy authority is credible if and only if, it
delivers on the inflation target conditional on economic, institutional and financial
stability factors that may have influenced policy credibility, as shown in the three
possible explanations in the 1970s great inflation period. Therefore, the model
equation is formalised as3
CIt = ψCIt−1 + φzt + εt, (5.7)
where ψ is credibility persistence and φ is a vector of parameters. zt captures
macroeconomic, financial and institutional stability variables that affect policy
authority credibility and εt is the error term. In this paper, however, the main
focus is on macroeconomic stability variables, such as policy rate, inflation and
output growth.
3The one period ahead expected inflation is used because it is mostly assumed that monetary
policy is conducted over a short time horizon. Typically, in the forward looking policy rule
literature, the k-period ahead forecast of inflation is usually twelve month when using monthly
data or 4 quarters ahead when using quarterly data, see Clarida et al. (1998) for a brief discus-
sion. (Clarida R, Gali, Gertler M (1998) Monetary policy rules in practice: Some international
evidence. Eur. Econ. Rev. 42, 1033 1067)
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5.4 Method, Data and Stylised Facts
5.4.1 Econometric Method
Eq. (5.7) is modeled as a regime-switching with time-varying transition probabil-
ities of policy credibility following Filardo (1994) and Filardo and Gordon (1998).
According to them, a Markov-switching vector autoregression model with a time-
varying transition probabilities takes a reduced-form as
xt = c(st) +B1(st)xt−1 + ...Bp(st)xt−p + µt, (5.8)
where xt for t = 1, . . . , T is an M × 1 vector of all endogenous variables and
xt−1 is M × 1 vector of all exogenous variables. The matrices c(st) and B(st) are
functions of the model parameters. These assume S-state Markov chain st with a
time-varying transition matrix governed by P probability matrix of the form
P (St = st|St = st−1, gt) =
 p(gt) 1− q(gt)
1− p(gt) q(gt)
 , (5.9)
where p(gt) is the time-varying transition probability in state 1 and [1 − p(gt)]
is the movement from state 1 to state 2. q(gt) is the time-varying transition
probabilities in state 2 and [1 − q(gt)] is the movement from state 2 to state 1.
gt is the past values of the economic indicators and are obtained through the
unobserved variables. This is required to avert endogeneity bias and to show that
economic indicators are observed at the end of the period.
The transition probabilities are obtained by transforming the cummulative
distribution function (CDF) into a standard normal distribution to yield
p(g) = prob(St = 1|st = 2) = φ(−α0 − α1gt−m), (5.10)
q(gt) = prob(St = 2|st = 1) = 1− φ(α0 − α1gt−m − α2), (5.11)
St are the observed state variables that take the form
St = α0 + α1gt−m + st−1 + ωt, (5.12)
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where α measures the effect of the frequency of the regimes and the information
content of the economic indicators gt. When α1 = 0, the model reverts to constant
transition probabilities.
Eqs. (5.8), (5.9) and (5.12) form the MS-VAR and is estimated conditional on
the joint densities which nest the information in the data and the time-varying
transition probabilities to the estimation method.
In estimating the MS-VAR, Bayesian inference is carried out which combines
the prior densities with the likelihood function to estimate the posterior densities
using Gibbs sampler. Because a straightforward estimation of the MS-Bayesian
VAR is complicated, it is circumvented by adopting a two-step estimation pro-
cedure. First, the BVAR based on the path of the observed state variables is
estimated. This is then followed by estimating the transition probabilities and the
frequency of the regimes, given the BVAR parameters. The VAR takes the form
Xt = Ztβt + εt εt is i.i.d. ∼ N(0, It), (5.13)
where Xt for t = 1, . . . , T is an M ×1 vector of observed variables and Zt is M ×k
a matrix containing an intercept and p lags of each of the observed variables and
k = M(1+ρM). βt are the model parameters and εt is the stochastic shock which
follows an identically independent distribution.
Following Bańbura et al. (2010), the prior densities of the Bayesian VAR
through a dummy observation approach is initiated. It then follows that the




























Eq. (5.14) helps to pin down the autoregressive parameters in the dummies
prior matrix of Xd and the intercept and variance covariance prior matrix of Zd.
δ1, ..., δm restrict the tightness of the priors on the first lag and σ1, ..., σm are the
diagonal elements of the variance covariance matrix of eq. (5.13) and ν1, ..., νm are
the means of the vector Xt. The parameters λ and τ restrict the VAR variables
not to depend on the processes and the prior parameters. The values of λ = 0.2








t is i.i.d. ∼ N(0, I∗t ). (5.15)
After this, the Gibbs sampler is initiated. This follows the procedure as: first,
the Markov process regime probabilities matrix [0− 1] is drawn using the Baum-
Hamilton-Lee-Kim filter and smoother to obtain the regime probabilities. The
draws are based on standard forward filter and backward sampling algorithms.
Secondly, the Markov transitions matrix is drawn conditional on other parameters
that take draws from the Dirichlet posterior densities.
Thirdly, the regression procedure is updated conditional on the state-space
approach and the Markov-switching process to estimate the number of regimes
in the model. Fourthly, the error variance covariance from the inverse Wishart
distribution is drawn conditional on step three and, finally, the parameters of the
model for the observed variables from their multivariate normal posterior densities
are drawn.
5.4.2 Data
Firstly, the identification strategy is discussed, followed by data description. In
this thesis, the researcher undertakes two identification strategies in relation to
the Bayesian VAR and the switching regimes. In the BVAR ordering, generalised
4Note: Detailed derivations can be found in Bańbura et al. (2010). For a brief history of
dummy observations see http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/DummyObs/DumObsPriorSlides.pdf.
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dynamic responses are employed. These are invariant to the ordering of the vari-
ables in the model. To identify a high and a low credibility regime, it is proposed
that regime 1 is a low credibility regime in that monetary aggregates regime was
in place and regime 2 is a high credibility regime following an inflation targeting
regime.
South African quarterly data from 1986:Q1 to 2016:Q3 is used. The choice of
the beginning sample point is motivated by monetary aggregates targeting first
introduced in 1986. This study data is sourced from the IMF International Finan-
cial Statistics and the South African Reserve Bank databases. The variables used
are real GDP, consumer price index inflation, policy rate and credibility indicator.
The log difference of the real GDP seasonally adjusted and consumer price index
are taken to capture their growth rates. Policy rate is measured as a percentage
per annum and is the SARB’s repurchase rate (repo rate).
Following Cecchetti and Krause (2002), who use an inflation target of 2 per
cent in their original model as is a normal practice in the literature to ensure
international comparison, and inflation limit of 20 per cent to show that once
policy authority exceeds this limit, it looses control over inflation. In this thesis,
credibility indicator is measured using a realised inflation rate and the mid-point of
the SARB medium-term inflation target of 4.5 per cent over the inflation targeting
regime and the mid-point of an effective inflation target is used in the monetary
aggregates regime. To obtain an effective inflation target in a monetary aggregates
regime, eq. (5.6) is used and in an inflation targeting regime the SARB medium-
term inflation target bands are used.
With respect to the inflation limit, a 20 per cent limit in the monetary aggre-
gates regime is set similar to Cecchetti and Krause (2002). The reason for this
is that a monetary aggregates regime is characterised by high inflation and the
primary goal of policy authority is not directed towards only price and economic
stability. Whereas in an inflation targeting regime, an inflation limit of 10 per cent
is used consistent with Montes (2013), who conducted a similar study for Brazil.
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Moreover, in an inflation targeting regime, the SARB primary policy objective is
price stability with a balanced and sustainable economic growth.
5.4.3 Stylised Facts
This section describes briefly the time series properties, but particular attention
is paid to the discussion of a credibility indicator. Further, diagnostic tests in
the form of a unit root, Johansen’s cointegration test, Granger causality test and
a simple regression estimates are conducted to identify the stability of the series
and whether the series have the appropriate signs, a priori, to reduce spurious
conclusions in the generalised dynamic responses.
5.4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 5.1 plots the evolution of credibility and macroeconomic indicators. The
top left panel of Figure 5.1 is credibility. It is found in the monetary aggregates
regime that a credibility indicator behaves well and mostly remains stable within
a credibility threshold of 1 and 0. However, the SARB credibility worsened in
1992 as a result of the political struggle leading to the 1994 general election.
During the unofficial inflation targeting in 1998, the Bank’s credibility in-
creased and remains the highest in the monetary aggregates regime. After the
announcement of explicit inflation targeting, credibility deteriorated in 2001 as
a result of the depreciation of the rand against the U.S. dollar by about 20 per
cent over the last quarter of 2001. This trend is very similar to that discovered
in Mariscal et al. (2011), who find that once inflation targeting regime was an-
nounced in the U.K., economic agents were optimistic that policy authority would
deliver on its inflation target. However, when the Bank of England failed to deliver
its target within the short term period, economic agents discredited the Bank’s
ability to deliver on the annouced inflation target.
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Figure 5.1: Evolution of credibility and macroeconomic indicators
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Over an inflation targeting regime, 2001 and 2008 are identified as the low
credibility periods. Credibility falls below the lowest threshold of zero (0). The
possible sources contributing to this pattern of a low credibility was the exchange
rate shock in 2001 and the oil price shock that peaked in 2008, coupled with the
financial crisis in 2008. This resulted in a tight monetary policy stance. The policy
rate peaked at 13 and 12 per cent in 2001 and 2008, respectively. Realised inflation
also peaked at 12 and 13 per cent during the same periods. This contracted the
real GDP growth rate from 4.2 per cent in 2001 to 2.7 per cent in 2002 and also
from 5.6 per cent in 2006 to negative 1.5 per cent in 2009. The periods 2001
and 2008 can be described as those in which the SARB experienced most rapid
deterioration in credibility. This suggests that credibility matters in an inflation
targeting regime.
From 2002, credibility gains could be observed until the global financial crisis
set in. Policy rate declined from 12 per cent in 2002 to about 5 per cent in 2006.
This led to a decline in the inflation rate from 14 per cent in 2002 to about 3
per cent in 2006, which stimulates real GDP growth to 5.6 per cent in 2006. In
general, this period accounted for high credibility gains and the SARB delivered
on its inflation target as reported in the bottom right panel of Figure 5.1. In most
of the periods, inflation remained within the target band. Credibility picked up
from 2010 and stabilised between 2012 and 2014, around an average of 0.8. This
trend may account for relative stability in the policy rate and inflation over this
period.
A similar pattern emerges in the summary statistics reported in Table 5.1.
Over the monetary aggregates regime, average credibility was high compared to
an inflation targeting average of 0.92 and 0.76, respectively. However, the un-
certainty associated with monetary aggregates regime is high with a standard
deviation of 0.29 far from its mean compared to the inflation targeting regime
with a standard deviation of 0.49 relatively close to its mean, as reported in Table
5.1. The correlation coefficients of credibility with respect to the policy rate and
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics
Credibility Inflation Policy Rate GDP
Full Sample Regime 1 Regime 2
Mean 0.83 0.92 0.76 1.97 11.10 0.91
Median 0.85 0.90 0.78 1.81 1.50 0.66
Std. Dev. 0.42 0.29 0.47 1.19 4.26 0.84
Correlation -0.22 -0.04 0.05
Obs. 123 56 67 123 123 123
Note: Regime 1= monetary aggregate regime and regime 2=inflation targeting
regime. Inflation is log deviation of CPI, and GDP is log deviation of real
GDP Source: author’s estimation March 17, 2017
inflation show that credibility is negatively correlated with policy rate and infla-
tion in Table 5.1. This means that an increase in credibility leads to a reduction in
the policy rate and inflation, which is consistent with the dynamics of credibility
channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Lastly, the posterior densities from the Bayesian estimates used in this study
are examined in Figure 5.3 of Appendix C 5.7.2. As revealed in the top panel
of Figure 5.3, the posterior mean value of 0.68 suggests that on average policy
authority is credible across regimes. Although the standard deviation of 0.20 is
far from the mean, nearly all the observations are within a one standard deviation.
This suggests economic agents are excessively optimistic about credibility of the
SARB, and in some periods are overly pessimistic about the SARB conduct.
In the bottom panel of Figure 5.3, real GDP depicts a Gausian distribution
fairly with posterior densities of 0.66 and 0.77 for the mean and the standard
deviation. However, real GDP is characterised by high uncertainty compared to
the consumer price index inflation and the policy rate, as reported in the middle
panels of Figure 5.3.
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5.4.3.2 Diagnostic Tests
In the previous section, the evolution of the variables was observed. One im-
portant assessment is the stability of the variables. Hence, unit root, Johansen’s
cointegration and Granger causality tests are conducted. As reported in Table
5.3 of Appendix C 5.7.1, the unit root test, using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) indicates that, after taking the log deviations
of the consumer price inflation and real GDP, the series are stationary at all rel-
evant levels of marginal significance and similarly credibility indicator in levels.
However, the policy rate remains nonstationary at an even 10 per cent marginal
significance level, as reported in Table 5.3.
This prompted an experiment with the Johansen’s cointegration test as to
whether the series have a long run relationship. If so, there would be no need
to transform the policy rate series. The results in Table 5.4 of Appendix C 5.7.1
show that there exists at least one long run relationship among the variables. This
means that the policy rate can be used without differencing it in the estimation.
Regarding the Granger causality test reported in Table 5.5 of Appendix C
5.7.1, the ordering of the variables are credibility, policy rate, inflation and real
GDP. These suggest that credibility interacts with inflation but less with policy
rate and real GDP. Based on this ordering, the regression results in Table 5.2 and
the generalised dynamic responses in Figures 5.4 to 5.6 of Appendix C 5.7.2 were
obtained.
Table 5.2 reports the OLS and GMM parameter estimates. These allow for
an assessment of the signs and statistical significance of the parameters of the
variables. This provides a naive way of observing the impact of the policy rate,
inflation and real GDP on credibility. With respect to the estimates of the current
policy rate, interestingly, all the alternative specifications indicate that the current
policy rate parameters have an inverse relationship with credibility, as reported in
Table 5.2. Similarly, an increase in inflation results in a loss of credibility.
Therefore, pressures from policy rate and inflation to the movements of pol-
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Table 5.2: Regression estimates: Dependent variable credibility
1 2 3
Regressor OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
Constant 0.21(0.07) 0.21(0.07) 0.14(0.07) 0.13(0.06) 0.25(0.07) 0.25(0.07)
Cred.Indt−1 0.83(0.05) 0.82(0.06) 0.87(0.05) 0.88(0.06) 0.84(0.05) 0.84(0.06)
PolRatet -0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.01) -0.08(0.02) -0.08(0.04) -0.04(0.02) -0.04(0.03)
PolRatet−1 0.08(0.02) 0.08(0.04) 0.04(0.02) 0.04(0.03)
Inflationt -0.09(0.02) -0.09(0.03)
RealGDPt -0.03(0.02) -0.03(0.02)
Adj. R2 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.77 0.77
F − test 132.72 102.27 75.57
J − test 0.00056 0.00032 0.00018
χ2(p− val) 0.103 0.352 1.15
Source: Author’s estimation March 17, 2017 Note: OLS= ordinary least squares,
GMM=generalised method of moments, Standard errors are in parentheses
icy authority credibility exist. In addition, when the persistence of credibility is
taken into account in line with theoretical considerations, credibility persistence is
positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent marginal significance level. The
adjusted R2 and Ftest show that jointly the variables are significant in explaining
the variability in credibility. Similarly, when using the Jtest for the GMM esti-
mates, it fails to reject the validity of no overidentifying restrictions, and thus the
overall specification of the model and the set of its instruments are valid.
5.5 Empirical Results
Estimated results are reported in the following order. Firstly, the regime switches
in credibility is presented and it allows for the detection of the number of switches
in credibility and how credibility has evolved over the sample period. Following
this, the generalised dynamic responses for the full sample and the two monetary
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policy regimes are presented to examine the possible transmission channels.
5.5.1 Regime Switches in Credibility
To empirically determine the validity of the descriptive findings that the SARB is
credible, the estimates from the smoothed transition probabilities are used. Figure
5.2 presents the estimated smoothed transition probabilities for a mean credibility
indicator in the top panel, the variance of a credibility indicator in the middle
panel and a time-varying transition probabilities regimes in the bottom panel5. A
noticable feature of the series plot of the smoothed probabilities regimes of the
means and high variances of credibility indicator is that the values are erractic in
nature.
The estimates of the means credibility plotted in the top panel of Figure 5.2 is
capable of tracking the major periods in which the SARB lost credibility. These
dates include 1992, 2001 and 2008, all of which correspond with the sample points
25, 70 and 90 respectively and also coincide with the SARB’s downswing business
cycle phases. From the high variance regime in credibility reported in the middle
panel of Figure 5.2, most of the high volatility in credibility are located between
1990 and 2000, which match the sample points from 20 to 60. The second episode
of a high variance regime in credibility is 2005, that is, sample 80, in which the plot
shows that policy authority was credible before returning to a low credible policy
regime during the financial crisis in 2008. This evidence supports the argument
that the SARB did not follow the Taylor-type rule policy during the financial
crisis, and instead pursued policy that would stabilise the financial system.
5The estimates are transition probabilities not just normal probabilities. According to Khren-
nikov (1999), probabilities can be negative if a generalization of continuous time Markov chain
model with possibly hidden states between two consecutive jumps. This implies that there can
be negative transition probabilities for hidden states examine in the case of classical stochastic
processes. The model used is characterised by these features.
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Estimated time-varying transition probabilities in regimes
Estimated transition probabilities for variances regime in credibility
Estimated transition probabilities for mean regimes in credibility
Figure 5.2: Time-varying smoothed transition probabilities
Note: I encountered modeling challenges and could not capture the years on X-axis instead the
observation numbers. Sample points 1=1986:Q1, 20=1990:Q1, 40=1995:Q1, 60=2000:Q1,
80=2005:Q1, 100=2010:Q1 a d 120=2015:Q1.
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Time-varying transition probabilities for a low and high credibility regimes are
shown in the bottom panel of Figure 5.2. This shows that credibility evolves grad-
ually over time. In particular, during the persistence of a low credibility regime,
the SARB credibility went up in 1995 and in 2000 prior to explicit inflation tar-
geting regime and then switched from a high credibility regime to a low credibility
regime in 2008. After the financial crisis, the low credibility regime was phased
out beginning in 2010. The pattern for a low credibility regime is very similar
to the pattern of the time series data plot in Figure 5.1. Thus in the middle of
the 1980s, economic agents perceived the SARB as being less credible because
there were high levels of observed inflation and policy rate, whereas output was
low. From 1995 to 2000 and 2003 to 2007, larger credibility losses were minor and
short lived, whereas policy credibility gains appear to gather momentum after the
global financial crisis.
During a high credibility regime, policy switched from high to a low credibility
regime after 1990 and it remained there until 1999. Then, its probabilities peak
once again during the Asian crisis in 1998 and the exchange rate shocks in 2001.
Following this, the second state switched to a high credibility regime from 2003 to
2007. This coincided with the longest upswings in the SARB’s estimated busines
cycle phases that lasted approximately 99 months from 1999 to 2007. During the
financial crisis, the SARB credibility switched to a low state regime and, finally,
moved to a high state credibility regime in 2010. This shows that the financial crisis
episode had an adverse effect on the SARB policy credibility, which accounted for
cumulative increases in the policy rate of about 5 per cent and inflation peaks
at 12 per cent in 2008. This transmits output growth losses, as exhibited in the
middle left panel of Figure 5.1.
5.5.2 Generalised Dynamic Responses
The generalised dynamic responses are used to isolate the effects of credibility on
macroeconomic performance following a regime change. Figure 5.4 of Appendix C
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5.7.2 reports the generalised dynamic responses following a one standard deviation
of an unexpected shock to credibility, policy rate, inflation and output. The
confidence bands of the dynamic responses are plotted with 95 per cent probability
intervals for the posterior densities.
The first panel of Figure 5.4 shows the dynamic responses of credibility to
unexpected increases in the other variables. Policy rate reacts countercyclically,
leading to a decline in policy rate over the first six quarters. This transmits a
reduction in the inflation rate of about 0.1 per cent within the first four quarters.
Although real GDP does not response immediately, the uncertainty in real GDP
is wide, which suggests that economic agents are uncertain about the sudden gain
in credibility by the policy authority. This evidence suggests that it takes time to
build credibility, as is argued by Blinder (1999).
In the second panel of Figure 5.4, a positive real GDP shock enlarges uncer-
tainty in policy authority credibility. This means that private agents are uncertain
whether policy authority is exploiting the trade-off between output and inflation.
Overrall, this study has identified that high credibility stabilises policy rate and
inflation and helps reduce uncertainty in output growth.
Regarding the third panel of Figure 5.4, a positive unexpected inflation shock
generates about 1 percent loss in credibility. This is the largest shock to credibility
relative to shocks emanating from the policy rate, as reported in the third panel
of Figure 5.4. This suggests that economic agents are more concerned about the
fluctuations in inflation and also use the inflation rate changes to measure the level
of policy authority credibility in the South African economy. This result is very
similar to the findings of Montes (2013), where in an inflation targeting regime,
credibility gains affect economic agents inflation expectations which transmit to
investment and empolyment decisions. Policy rate responses to inflation shock
is about 0.3 per cent. As inflation and the policy rate begin to decrease, policy
authorities gain credibility and it peaks in the sixth quarter. However, the signal
to the real GDP growth remains uncertain to economic agents.
140
The fourth panel of Figure 5.4 depicts the dynamic responses of the policy
rate shock to the other variables. In this figure, credibility reacts countercyclically
to an unexpected positive policy shock. Thus credibility remains constant before
it increases during the second quarter, when the policy rate is declining. The
unexpected shock in policy rate generates an approximately 0.4 per cent increase
in inflation. The effect remains unchanged within the first three quarters before it
starts declining in the fourth quarter. In response to this, credibility strengthens
in the fourth quarter and leads to an increase in real GDP growth rate. This
finding suggests the importance of credibility in the conduct of monetary policy
in stabilising policy rate, inflation and output growth. This further implies that a
credible central bank needs not adjust policy rate frequently and may require less
effort to stabilise the economy.
5.5.3 A Comparison of Monetary and Inflation Targeting
Regimes Credibility
Figure 5.5 and 5.6 of Appendix C 5.7.2 compare monetary aggregates regime
relative to inflation targeting regime to determine the magnitude of credibility
and how it affects policy rate and movements in inflation and output growth. A
noticable difference between the two regimes is that the magnitude of inflation and
policy responses to credibility is larger over an inflation targeting regime relative
to a monetary aggregates regime. This implies that credibility is an important
element in the conduct of monetary policy during an inflation targeting regime.
Following a positive, yet an unexpected credibility shock, policy rate declines
by about 0.25 per cent, which leads to approximately 0.5 per cent reduction in
inflation over the inflation targeting regime, as reported in Figure 5.6. On the
contrary, a similar change in credibility over a monetary aggregates regime ac-
counts for less than 0.1 per cent reduction in the policy rate and inflation, as
shown in Figure 5.5. Similarly, a positive policy shock to credibility in an inflation
targeting regime results in an immediate loss of credibility of about 0.5 per cent
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but remains muted in a monetary aggregates regime at the initial stage before im-
proving marginally. Moreover, a one standard deviation from inflation generates
about a 1 per cent loss in credibility in an inflation targeting regime whilst this
accounts for less than 0.5 per cent in a monetary targeting regime. This clearly
shows the importance of credibility over the inflation targeting regime relative to
the monetary aggregates regime.
What is not surprising is that uncertainty in policy setting was predominant
in the monetary aggregates regime, as reported in Figure 5.5. This confirms that
if all things remain the same, the inflation targeting regime helps anchor inflation
and output volatility and serves as a catalyst for efficient policy rate setting.
This study certainly shows that the most relevant factor driving inflation and
output deviation is credibility. It is concluded, therefore, that credibility is one
of the most canonical toolkits that a central bank must possess in the conduct of
monetary policy over an inflation targeting regime. Without credibility, it will be
less possible for the policy authority to deliver on its policy objectives.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter evaluates central bank credibility and its effect on the policy rate,
inflation and output growth before and after the adoption of a new monetary
policy regime. The question is important in the light of current events, where
policy authorities have deviated from following their committed policy objectives
relative to unconventional monetary policy. This has been strongly criticised by
some economists and the general public because economic agents lose confidence in
such events in the conduct of monetary policy. In doing this, a Markov-switching
Bayesian VAR with time-varying transition probabilities is used. This is a unique
way of allowing the belief structure of credibility to evolve over time. South African
quarterly data covering the period 1986:Q1 to 2016:Q3 are used.
The results suggest that the smoothed transition probabilities in means and
variances of credibility index evolve gradually and are unstable over the sample
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period. This study tracks the major periods in which the SARB gained and lost
credibility. The results suggest that these coincide with the business cycle phases
in the South African economy. A distinctive pattern between monetary aggregates
and inflation targeting regimes is that the degree of inflation and policy rates
reaction to credibility shocks is larger in the latter relative to the former. Although
in the monetary aggregates regime, credibility behaves well and mostly remains
within the credibility threshold of 1 and 0, uncertainty surrounding credibility was
high relative to inflation targeting regime.
To sum up, it is found that credibility significantly influences changes in
macroeconomic fluctuations. This means that credibility should be one of the
key tools that policy authority should possess in the conduct of monetary policy
in an inflation targeting regime. Without it, policy authority may find it less
possible to achieve its policy objectives. It would be interesting in future research
to examine financial and fiscal stability variables on credibility to gain a broader
understanding of the dynamics of credibility in an inflation targeting regime.
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5.7 Appendix C: Chapter 5
5.7.1 Diagnostic Tests
Table 5.3: Unit root tests
series Lag ADF Test PP Test 1% crit. val. 5% crit. val 10% crit. val. P-value
Cred. Ind. Level -3.88 -3.62 -3.49 -2.89 -2.58 0.007
Inflation log diff. -5.39 -5.42 -3.49 -2.89 -2.58 0.000
Policy Rate Level -1.79 -1.50 -3.49 -2.89 -2.58 0.530
Real GDP log diff. -6.47 -6.69 -3.49 -2.89 -2.58 0.000
Source: Author’s estimation March 17, 2017
Table 5.4: Johansen’s cointegration test
Rank Eigenvalue Likelihood ratio P-value 5% critical val.
R=0* 0.18 -458.55 -0.023 47.86
R ≤ 1 0.11 -458.55 0.094 29.79
R ≤ 2 0.08 -451.78 0.089 18.49
R ≤ 3 0.03 -446.78 0.052 3.84
*denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 0.05% significance
level, P-values obtain by Mackinnon (1999) one sided p-values
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Table 5.5: Granger causality tests
Null Hypothesis Obs F-statistic Prob.
Policy rate does not Granger cause credibility 121 2.93 0.06
Credibility does not Granger cause policy rate 1.72 0.18
Inflation does not Granger cause credibility 121 0.48 0.62
Credibility does not Granger cause inflation 4.63 0.01
Real GDP does not Granger cause credibility 121 0.94 0.40
Credibility does not Granger cause real GDP 0.56 0.57
Policy rate does not Granger cause inflation 121 4.42 0.01
Inflation does not Granger cause policy rate 0.98 0.38
Real GDP does not Granger cause policy rate 121 1.61 0.21
Poicy rate does not Granger cause real GDP 0.95 0.39
Real GDP does not Granger cause inflation 121 0.05 0.95
Inflation does not Granger cause real GDP 4.20 0.02




Figure 5.3: Posterior densities
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Figure 5.4: Generalised dynamic responses—full sample
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Figure 5.5: Monetary aggregates regime generalised dynamic responses
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The purpose of this thesis has been to evaluate the extent of macroeconomic
dynamic responses to changes in policy regimes based on the proposition that
the Taylor-type rule better anchors inflation and output volatility. Chapter one
motivates and positions the themes presented in the thesis within the literature.
This is followed in chapter two by a comprehensive review of monetary policy
regimes in the South African economy, thereby providing nuances for the empirical
estimations that follow.
Chapter three analyses policy regime changes in relation to policy authority
preferences and looks at whether a particular central bank governor’s term is linked
to policy authority preferences. A time-varying vector autoregression is used to
capture the changing policy preferences and shocks. The main contribution of
this chapter is that it examines the importance of changes in policy preferences
and shocks and its effect on inflation and output in a way that is different from
studies that analyse the reaction of policy shocks on the economy only. Moreover,
two solution methods are initiated. These are the Kalman filter and independence
Metropolis-Hastings. The Kalman filter is used to obtain the weights a policy
authority attaches to inflation and output, whereas the independence Metropolis-
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Hastings estimates the generalised impulse responses and stochastic volatility in
a time-varying parameter setup. The relevance of this chapter includes, first, that
it shows that at different times and over different monetary policy regimes the
economy reacts differently to policy preferences and shocks. Secondly, the chapter
extends current research of policy regimes in the South African economy where
the analyses are restricted to traditional econometric methods, such as OLS and
the generalised method of moments. Finally, the counterfactual effects of how
policy would have been without changes in central bank governors, policy regimes
and the responses of the South African Reserve Bank to the recent global financial
crisis are examined.
The findings in chapter three suggest that policy changes have an important
effect on the weight a central bank attaches to inflation and output stability, and
governors’ preferences are linked to policy regime changes. This implies that the
beliefs of central bank governors should align with the policy regime in place at
the time of their appointment. The usefulness of this chapter is that it shows that
changes in central bank preferences are influenced by changes in monetary policy
regimes and not necessarily the tenure of different governors at the central bank.
Furthermore, the counterfactual analysis shows that the responses of the global
financial crisis would have been larger on the economy had the South African
Reserve Bank not reacted. Similarly, the weights attach to policy preferences
without a regime change would have been similar to an inflation targeting regime
with a smaller deviation, which presupposes that structural shocks play a role in
stabilising the economy over the inflation targeting regime.
Chapter four evaluates the reaction of policy regime-switching on macroeco-
nomic performance to identify whether the South African economy is characterised
by policy switches. This responds to the role played by policy preferences and
shocks on changes in inflation and output volatility in a structural model. A
Markov-switching dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is used and the
model is estimated by an efficient perturbution method, which allows for a single
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equilibrium condition relevant for economic analysis.
This chapter contributes to the literature by allowing the primary commodity
export sector shocks to depend on regime switches. The importance of this is that
it explains the effects of policy regime switches in emerging economies that depend
on primary commodity exports. This is relevant, because one of the factors that
influence slow economic growth in emerging economies is a decline in world demand
for their primary commodities and also a decline in primary commodity prices.
It is found that policy shocks have minimal effects on macroeconomic volatility
when the structural innovations are accounted for in a regime-dependent analysis.
This thesis also establishes that volatility in the structural innovations outperform
constant dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.
Further, the policy rate reaction in an inflation targeting regime is much larger
compared to a monetary aggregates regime. Whereas in a monetary aggregates
regime, an export shock to policy rate responses is larger relative to that in an
inflation targeting regime. This suggests that in an inflation targeting regime low
export shock volatility helps in stabilising inflation and output volatility prior to
the global financial crisis. It is, therefore, proposed here that policy evaluation
based on constant dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models should be used
sparingly to draw conclusions on recent macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging
economies because of changes in the shocks volatility that affect the economy.
In chapter five, the responses of central bank credibility to macroeconomic fluc-
tuations when there is a policy regime change are investigated. The unobservable
dynamics of policy authority credibility over time is estimated using a Markov-
switching Bayesian autoregression with time-varying transition probabilities. The
reason for this is that there is no consensus on whether central bank credibility is
enhanced when policy authority adopts a new policy regime. Secondly, the South
African Reserve Bank switched it inflation target from the consumer price index
excluding mortgage interest cost to the overall consumer price index, something
which is likely to undermine the Bank’s credibility. This chapter responds to these
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issues to understand how macroeconomic variables react to policy authority cred-
ibility and also allow the data to assign the switches in credibility instead of the
researcher.
Finally, it is found in chapter five that credibility positively affects changes in
macroeconomic fluctuations. Therefore, credibility should be one of the canonical
instruments that a policy authority must possess in the design of monetary policy.
This finding is of particular policy relevance in the ongoing debate about whether
the unexpected changes in macroeconomic volatility will persist, given the uncon-
ventional monetary policy practice in developed economies and weak economic
growth recorded in emerging economies.
6.2 Future Research
This thesis has shown empirically that policy regime changes are necessary to
stabilise inflation and output in an economy. However, there are other aspects
of policy regimes that this thesis could not address that needs further research.
In chapter three a backward-looking time-varying policy regime is analysed. It
would be important to examine a forward-looking time-varying policy regime both
with and without the policy rate smoothing to understand monetary policy as an
inflation forecasting regime. This will help to track a policy regime in accordance
with the tenets of an inflation targeting regime to ensure effective central bank
accountability and credibility to economic agents.
The limitation of chapter four is that the transition probabilities are constant
over time, which may require a new estimation strategy to endogenised it in future
work. Finally, in chapter five, the effects of financial stability and fiscal policy on
central bank credibility were not investigated. This could be examined to broaden
the understanding in this area in future research.
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